


DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENT **C**
CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS



**A new strategy for
gender equality post 2015
Workshop
3 September 2014 - Part I**

WORKSHOP FOR THE FEMM COMMITTEE



DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

GENDER EQUALITY

**A new strategy for gender equality
post 2015**

Compilation of briefing notes - part I

Workshop
3 September 2014

Abstract

Upon request by the FEMM Committee, the Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Policy Department will hold a workshop on "A new strategy for gender equality post 2015". The Workshop will provide an analysis and respective recommendations for actions to be taken by the European Commission and other European actors before 2020 in 7 different areas to improve the situation of women and to reach gender equality: Gender Mainstreaming, Gender Budgeting and monitoring; Economic independence and the position of women on the labour market; Maternity leave, paternity leave and parental leave and unpaid care work; Women in political and economic decision-making; Dignity, integrity and violence against women; and Gender aspects of foreign affairs and development cooperation.

**Document requested by the
Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CEU	Council of European Union
CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czech Republic
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
EC	European Commission
ECE	East-Central Europe
EE	Estonia
EIGE	European Institute for Gender Equality
ES	Spain
EU	European Union
FI	Finland
FLFP	Female Labour Force Participation
FR	France
GEI	Gender Equality Index
GGP	Gender Gap in Pensions
GIA	Gender Impact Assessment
GPG	Gender Pay Gap
GR	Greece
GS	Gender Stereotypes

HR	Croatia
HU	Hungary
IE	Ireland
ILO	International Labour Organization
IS	Iceland
IT	Italy
LT	Lithuania
LTC	Long Term Care
LU	Luxembourg
LV	Latvia
MT	Malta
NL	The Netherlands
NO	Norway
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
SE	Sweden
SI	Slovenia
SIP	Social Investment Package
SK	Slovakia
SPC	Social Protection Committee
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TRF	Total Fertility Rate
UK	United Kingdom

GENDER MAINSTREAMING, GENDER BUDGETING, AND MONITORING IN POST 2015 GENDER EQUALITY POLICY

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Abstract

Upon request by the FEMM Committee, this report analyses the role of gender mainstreaming, gender budgeting, gender equality monitoring and anti-gender stereotyping measures in the context of European Union's post-2015 gender equality framework.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Gender Mainstreaming (Art 8 TFEU) vs. concrete measures (Art. 157, 4 and elsewhere)

The dual approach provides an effective range of tools to address gender mainstreaming and should be retained in the post-2015 gender equality policy.

Implementation of EU equality laws and policies remains uneven.

Effectiveness of gender mainstreaming within EU institutions and within Member States remains very uneven.

Institutional mechanisms among which Gender Impact Assessments and monitoring

EIGE offers improved EU capacity to monitor progress, identify good practice and develop models and proposals.

The absence of good data on important issues such as gender-based violence presents a continuing obstacle.

The EU should affirm its commitment to the EU Gender Equality Index and consider how it will be utilised to measure and monitor the effectiveness of its strategy.

Gender training should form part of a wider capacity-building strategy that includes post training activities, monitoring systems and organisational changes.

Gender Impact Assessment, though a valuable tool in some contexts, is only one of a range of tools required to enable the EU to deliver its commitment to gender equality.

The elimination of stereotypes and the role of the media

Gender stereotyping is an issue for the EU because negative stereotypes prevent individuals from fulfilling their potential by limiting choice and opportunity, undermining the economic strategies of the EU.

Stereotyping can undermine anti-discrimination laws and other EU policies by providing the basis for decisions based on stereotypes rather than evidence.

The dual strategy for gender equality offers the EU a range of tools to tackle gender stereotyping, from Directives and Regulations in areas where stereotyping directly challenges the effectiveness of the Single Market to the sharing of good practice and the conduct of studies to improve our understanding of the consequences of stereotyping and of efforts to address it.

Gender budgeting

Gender analysis should be an integral part of the EU budgetary process and the Multiannual Financial Framework. This analysis includes considering general macroeconomic targets as they are used to design EU economic and social policies (growth and efficiency).

Gender budgeting represents a tool for achieving good governance standards (transparency and accountability).

Gender budgeting is a particularly powerful tool to reveal and address the disproportionate effects of austerity policies on women by examining the corresponding fiscal and budgetary measures in a transparent way.

INTRODUCTION

The broad context in which a new strategy for gender equality post 2015 must operate presents distinct challenges compared to the context in which previous strategies were formulated. On the one hand, the global economic crisis and the resultant turn to austerity measures in the Member States has impacted heavily on women as employees² and service-providers and as users of state-funded services and has drawn attention to the key role of public expenditure and supporting policies in contributing to the advancement of gender equality. On the other hand, increased disaffection with the European Union (EU) adds impetus to the need for the EU to demonstrate its contribution to improvements in the economic and social wellbeing of its citizens, including gender equality and the reconciliation of work and family life.

Improvements in the economy globally and within the EU are highlighting weaknesses in Member State economies and increasingly exposing skills shortages, while continuing globalisation makes urgent the need to ensure that the EU is fully developing and utilising the potential of its workforce to improve its competitive position.

The ability and capacity of the EU to monitor and demonstrate the progress achieved in gender equality has been significantly increased by the establishment of the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and consideration is given in this report to some of the ways in which EIGE can support the EU's gender equality strategy post 2015.

² The precise impacts appear to vary between Member States but include in some cases lower levels of employment, in others more casualisation or underemployment and in others greater levels of employment as sole breadwinners. Men's employment too has been affected differently in different Member States.

1. GENDER MAINSTREAMING (ART 8 TFEU) VS. CONCRETE MEASURES (ART. 157, 4 TFEU AND ELSEWHERE)

KEY FINDINGS

- The dual approach provides an effective range of tools to address gender mainstreaming and should be retained in the post-2015 gender equality policy.
- Implementation of EU equality laws and policies remains uneven.
- Effectiveness of gender mainstreaming within EU institutions and within Member States remains very uneven.

The dual approach to gender mainstreaming adopted by the EU in its Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015³ (the integration of the gender dimension in all policy areas and specific measures) provides an effective range of tools to address gender mainstreaming and should be retained in the post-2015 gender equality policy. In Annex I, the relevant Strengths/Weaknesses/Opportunities/Threats have been identified.

During the 2010-2015 period significant initiatives have been taken and measures adopted under both approaches:

1.1 Integration of the gender dimension in all policy areas

In the Strategy for 2010-2015, the EU identified six priority areas, equal economic independence; equal pay for equal work and work of equal value; equality in decision-making; dignity, integrity and ending gender-based violence, gender equality in external action policy, and horizontal issues. The Report on Progress on equality between women and men in 2013⁴ indicates that progress has been made in each of the first five priority areas and, in relation to horizontal issues, it is clear that important gender mainstreaming initiatives have been taken in areas not specifically prioritised such as the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme⁵ and Horizon 2020⁶.

The development of a new strategy offers an opportunity to review progress under the first five priority areas and to consider whether these remain the areas of highest priority, and to consider whether more could be done to support development in relation to horizontal issues (see 2 below).

³ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015, Brussels, 21.9.2010, COM (2010) 491 final.

⁴ Commission Staff Working Document, Report on Progress on equality between women and men in 2013, Brussels, 14.4.2014, SWD(2014) 142 final

⁵ Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme for the period 2014 to 20, OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 62-72.

⁶ Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the EP and the Council of 11-12-2013 – JL 347 of 20-12-2013.

1.2 Concrete measures

During 2010-14, there have been relatively few additions to the *acquis communautaire*⁷ in the field of gender equality; however, there have been some important concrete measures adopted in specific fields, such as Horizon 2020.

The need to use concrete measures is particularly pressing where such measures can enhance the EU's competitive position and to promote growth, for example where the talent pool is currently underexploited and well-qualified and skilled workers (whether women or men) are routinely underrepresented in particular sectors of the economy or parts of the workforce.

Concrete measures can also be considered as a useful way to remind Member States of their existing obligations and to encourage better compliance. A clear example of this approach is the Commission's Recommendation of 7.3.2014 on strengthening the principle of equal pay between men and women through transparency.⁸

In line with the principle of subsidiarity and the need for the EU to work in cooperation with the Member States, a wide range of specific measures ranging from Directives and Regulations to recommendations and more tailored governance approaches such as those used in relation to the European Employment Strategy remain available to the EU institutions.

2. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS AMONG WHICH GENDER IMPACT ASSESSMENTS AND MONITORING

KEY FINDINGS

- EIGE offers improved EU capacity to monitor progress, identify good practice and develop models and proposals.
- The absence of good data on important issues such as gender-based violence presents a continuing obstacle.
- The EU should affirm its commitment to the EU Gender Equality Index (GEI) and consider how it will be utilised to measure and monitor the effectiveness of its strategy.
- Gender training should form part of a wider capacity-building strategy that includes post-training activities, monitoring systems and organisational changes.
- Gender Impact Assessment (GIA), though a valuable tool in some contexts, is only one of a range of tools required to enable the EU to deliver its commitment to gender equality.

⁷ The last significant EU legislative initiative in the field of gender equality, Directive 2010/41/EU, addressed a gap in the *acquis* relating to the self-employed.

⁸ C (2014) 1405 final, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2014/c_2014_1405_en.pdf : see also Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the

2.1. Institutional Mechanisms

A 2013 overview on institutional mechanisms by EIGE identified mixed trends in the allocation of resources to support gender equality in Member States, and some ambivalence regarding gender mainstreaming⁹. Consideration should be given in the new Strategy to how to support the December 2013 Council Conclusions on the Effectiveness of institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women and gender equality¹⁰, which called on Member States to maintain strong institutional mechanisms for promoting gender equality.

2.2. Monitoring

The EU should maintain and improve where possible the monitoring of gender equality through the Annual Report on Progress on Equality Between Women and Men, and sector-specific reports such as the 2013 Report on the Implementation of the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women Empowerment in Development 2010-2015 (see Appendix II). Consideration should be given to the role such monitoring activities can play in enhancing the implementation of policies, and in improving communication and accountability between the EU institutions *inter se*, and between the EU, the Member States and stakeholder groups, in relation to gender equality.

The ability and capacity of the EU to monitor and demonstrate the progress achieved in gender equality has been significantly increased by the establishment of EIGE officially launched in 2010. The development of a new Strategy affords an important opportunity to consider ways in which EIGE can further support the EU's gender equality strategy post 2015.

Of particular significance and potential utility is the GEI developed by EIGE which is tailored to the EU and which identifies gaps between women and men across a broad range of areas (see 2.3, below). In addition, significant work has been done during the period covered by the current Strategy to identify, for the first time, the involvement of men in gender equality across the EU Member States. The EU should consider how the capacity offered by EIGE can be utilised to enhance monitoring tools and activities across all areas of activities.

The absence of good data on important issues such as gender-based violence presents a continuing obstacle generally speaking and in particular for the further development of the GEI.

The statistical gap concerning the measurement of gender-based violence undermines the European Parliament's efforts to give greater priority to an EU framework to fight violence against women and better information has been called for by both the Parliament and the Council. The development of a new strategy for the post-2015 period offers a valuable opportunity to consider how the EU might contribute to the development of better information and monitoring mechanisms to enable this statistical gap to be filled.

principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast).

⁹ EIGE, Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States: Institutional Mechanisms for the Advancement of Gender Equality, 15905/13 ADD 1.

¹⁰ Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women and gender equality, 9th and 10th Dec, 2013.

2.3. Gender Equality Index

The EU should affirm its commitment to the GEI and consider how it will be utilised to measure and monitor the effectiveness of its strategy.

The development by EIGE of the GEI raises important questions about how this index will be embedded into the gender equality strategy of the EU post 2015. "Through analysing the impact on individual women and men, the Index can demonstrate the progress of the Member States in the implementation of EU policies, and add additional perspectives to the process of assessing the achievement of targets defined in the European Semester."¹¹

The EU should also consider how it can support EIGE in adopting proposals to address gaps in the datasets used to compile the GEI, which represent gaps in the availability of robust and comparable data about areas of activity important to the promotion of gender equality.

2.4. Gender Training

Gender training should form part of a wider capacity-building strategy that includes post training activities, monitoring systems, and organisational changes.

Significant steps have been taken to draw together information and evidence about the availability, quality and effectiveness of gender training initiatives. The mapping of training carried out by EIGE¹² has identified in a systematic way for the first time the gap which exists between high-level commitment to gender mainstreaming and the development of the capacity, knowledge and skills amongst officials to successfully deliver this commitment (see Appendix II). This presents a valuable opportunity for the EU to take steps within its own institutions to address this issue whilst also contributing to efforts to improve the situation in the Member States and in international organisations such as the UN, which have also been shown to fall short of what is required to make gender mainstreaming effective.

Gender training, of an appropriate quality, should be considered as part of a wider capacity-building strategy that includes post training activities, monitoring systems and organisational changes. This should include discussion on the accommodation of diversity and intersectionality in gender training programmes, as well as how to communicate the benefits of gender training.

2.5. Gender Impact Assessment

Gender Impact Assessment (GIA) can be a valuable tool in some contexts, though it is only one of a range of tools required to enable the EU to deliver on its commitment to gender equality.

¹¹ EIGE *Gender Equality Index, Report*, 2013, p.136 (available at <http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/gender-equality-index-main-findings>).

¹² Mapping gender training in the European Union and Croatia: Synthesis report (EIGE, 2013), available at <http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/mapping-gender-training-in-the-european-union-and-croatia-synthesis-report>.

The EU's commitment to impact assessment is long-standing (since 2003) and has evolved over time. A comparative study carried out by the OECD¹³ identifies considerable strengths in the EU's processes: the high level of commitment, the parallel positioning of impact assessment, the resources and training available, the attention to quality brought by the IA Board, and the transparency, including stakeholder involvement, in Impact Assessments. However, the report also highlights a number of weaknesses, including in relation to social issues (including gender) and in relation to the process itself (such as the lack of any opportunity for stakeholders to view and comment on the draft before final publication).

The EU's general Impact Assessment process is supplemented in many areas by more specific GIA requirements. The mid-term review of the Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015)¹⁴ identifies many areas where specific gender scrutiny provisions are incorporated into EU instruments in place of a more general impact assessment requirement, allowing for the use of clear criteria and principles tailored to the area in question: besides enabling a robust assessment of gender impact if designed carefully, this is an effective mechanism for improving understanding and capacity relating to gender issues within the EU and the Member States.

A recent seminar on Exchange of Good Practices on Gender Equality¹⁵ identified wide variations in practice across the EU Member States in relation to GIA, including some states with advanced and respected processes in use, and others where no GIA tools have yet been developed. It is generally recognised that the wider cultural context plays an important part in determining whether GIA requirements lead to improved outcomes. An important balance has to be achieved between making tools simple enough to be used by a wide range of officials, and oversimplifying complex social and economic issues. A flexible approach, allowing different approaches to be used for different issues, seems necessary, rather than a rigid tool. Moreover, GIA will succeed best where there is high level political support, accountability for the quality of assessments, and a good range of tools, data and monitoring mechanisms to underpin the process.

Consideration should be given to how the EU can enhance its own practice in this area, and continue to make GIA mandatory in particular policy areas where the need can be seen to be great. The EU should also consider how it can support GIA in Member States through further studies, exchange of good practice and recommendations. However, increased emphasis on GIA should not be at the expense of the development of other tools, data, and monitoring mechanisms: rather these tools are mutually reinforcing and a balanced approach should be sought which seeks to enhance the ability of the EU and the Member States to better deliver on the commitment to advance gender equality.

¹³ OECD *Sustainability in Impact Assessment. A Review of Impact Assessment Systems in selected OECD Countries and the European Commission* 12th February 2012, SG/SD(2011)6/FINAL.

¹⁴ Commission Staff Working Document on the mid-term review of the Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015), SWD(2013) 339 final, Annex 1.

¹⁵ See European Commission, Justice, Exchange of Good Practices on Gender Equality, Gender Impact Assessment, Austria 3-4 June 2014, Summary Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/exchange_of_good_practices_at/140804_summary_report_at_2014_en.pdf.

3. THE ELIMINATION OF GENDER STEREOTYPES AND THE MEDIA

KEY FINDINGS

- Gender stereotyping is an issue for the EU because negative stereotypes prevent individuals from fulfilling their potential by limiting choice and opportunity, undermining the economic strategies of the EU.
- Stereotyping can further undermine anti-discrimination laws and other EU policies by providing the basis for decisions based on stereotypes rather than evidence.
- The dual strategy for gender equality offers the EU a range of tools to tackle gender stereotyping, from Directives and Regulations in areas where stereotyping directly challenges the effectiveness of the Single Market to the sharing of good practice and the conduct of studies to improve understanding of the consequences of stereotyping and of efforts to address it.

3.1 Background to gender stereotypes

A widely accepted **definition** of stereotypes states that they are 'based on socially constructed norms, practices and beliefs' and that '[t]hey are often cultural, and religion-based and -fostered, and reflect underlying power relations'.¹⁶ It is important to acknowledge that stereotypes 'are not inherently negative, but because they are assumptions that disregard a person's individual and inherent abilities, opportunities and environment, they tend to be prejudicial'.¹⁷ Research at Member State level has consistently pointed, on the one hand, to a chronic underrepresentation of women in professional and expert roles in news programmes and documentaries, and, on the other, to a proliferation of sexualised female images in advertising.¹⁸ Gender stereotypes rarely operate alone and are often perpetuated by an individual's race, age, sexual orientation, class, disability etc.¹⁹ This discussion focuses on ways in which the EU can play a role in challenging stereotypes around gender, but does so in full awareness that this is just one part of the picture and that policy-making must be informed by an understanding of the many prejudices that surround women's individual situations.

¹⁶ This definition is adopted by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), Countering Gender Discrimination and Negative Gender Stereotypes: Effective Policy Responses, 13 July 2011, available at www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2011/7/countering-gender-discrimination-and-negative-gender-stereotypes-effective-policy-responses; and the European Parliament, Report on Eliminating Gender Stereotypes in the EU, 2012/2116(INI), 6 December 2012.

¹⁷ UN Women, *ibid*.

¹⁸ European Commission, Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men: Opinion on "Breaking gender stereotypes in the media" (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/opinions_advisory_committee/2010_12_opinion_on_breaking_gender_stereotypes_in_the_media_en.pdf. See further the EIGE database of stories from the 'Study of collected narratives on gender perceptions in 27 EU Member States', available at <http://eige.europa.eu/gender-stereotype-stories>.

¹⁹ Cook, R. and Cusack, S., *Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives* (2010, Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press).

3.2 Gender stereotypes and the media: a case for EU action

Gender stereotyping in the media ensures that **presumptions and prejudices** about the roles of women and men permeate every area of society, from employment to education to law-making, which can have consequences of relevance to the EU in a number of ways. First, negative stereotypes prevent individuals from fulfilling their potential by limiting choice and opportunity,²⁰ which in turn undermines strategies in relation to economic growth and the achievement of the Single Market.²¹ In particular, gendered employment patterns can be reinforced by policies that are grounded in presumptions, perpetuated by media representations, about the roles of women and men, both in the work place and within the domestic sphere. Similarly, certain professions are often depicted within the media as being inherently female or male.²² This is the case in relation to careers in the sciences and engineering, where women are under-represented – and caring professions, such as nursing and teaching, which recruit lower numbers of men. Second, stereotyping is a **root cause** of gender inequality,²³ thus undermining the EU's broader anti-discrimination agenda.²⁴ Legislative and policy actions may be informed by stereotypes, rather than solid evidence: thus, within the institutions, it is vital that all legislative and non-legislative activity responds to the lived reality of people's lives. Finally, gender stereotyping can be the basis of, and a justification for, **violence** against women.²⁵ Of particular concern are certain sectors of the advertising industry which use violent imagery of women, which is often of a sexual nature, to sell products.²⁶

Both the European Parliament and the Commission have published **reports and studies** on the role of the EU in combating gender stereotyping in the media in recent years.²⁷ This is supplemented by Council of Europe activity in the area²⁸ and a significant body of work from EIGE²⁹, suggesting a growing consensus on the need for action in this area which should be realised under the next strategy for gender equality (see also Annex III).

3.3 Challenges to be met by EU action in relation to gender stereotyping in the media

Whilst there is a clear justification for EU intervention to challenge gender stereotyping in the media, any actions must be tailored to the difficult framework that surrounds media regulation and the varying cultural approaches to the roles of women and men in society across the Member States. In respect of the former, it must be borne in mind that in many Member States state interference in the media sector is highly unusual and so binding provisions might not always be appropriate. Furthermore, any action must be implemented in full awareness of the right to freedom of expression found among others in Article 11 of

²⁰ UN Women, op cit., note 14.

²¹ For example, gender stereotypes may impact upon the free movement provisions (Articles 30, 45 and 56; goods, persons and services, respectively), as well as the Europe 2020 strategy for economic growth.

²² Crowley, N., *A policy response to gender perceptions: Discussion Paper* (2013), Luxembourg: EIGE, 5.

²³ Crowley, *ibid*, 4; UN Women, op. cit. note 14.

²⁴ Article 23 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; Article 3 TEU; Articles 8 and 10 TFEU.

²⁵ Forest, M. and Platero, R., *Report Analysing Intersectionality in Gender Equality Policies for Spain and the EU*, QUING Project, Vienna: Institute for Human Sciences, available at http://www.quing.eu/files/results/ir_spain.pdf accessed 11 August 2014, 32-33.

²⁶ European Commission op. cit. note 16; European Parliament op. cit. note 14.

²⁷ Commission and European Parliament, *ibid*.

²⁸ See the report of the Council of Europe Gender Equality Commission on the conference 'Media and the Image of Women', Amsterdam, 4-5 July 2013 (GEC (2013) 5 FINAL)

²⁹ See the EIGE website for details of their work on gender stereotypes <http://eige.europa.eu/content/gender-stereotypes> accessed 11 August 2014.

the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The broad range of tools associated with mainstreaming has a **valuable role** to play; the use of 'soft' measures such as target-setting and awareness raising can offer a more acceptable regulatory option. Indeed, many of the previous successes of gender mainstreaming have been achieved through the use of soft measures to complement hard legislative action.³⁰ Furthermore, any activity in relation to challenging gender stereotypes in the media must avoid imposing a particular cultural ideal surrounding the roles of women and men that may not be accepted in all Member States. It is important to recognise that gender equality is at different stages, and pursued through different means, across the EU. Offering a range of options to Member States, in a supporting, coordinating and educating role, to allow challenging of gender stereotypes in the media through means that are appropriate to the specific environment can be an effective option.

3.4 The use of a mainstreaming approach to challenge gender stereotyping in the media

It is suggested that gender mainstreaming tools are well suited to providing a framework for combating gender stereotypes, particularly within the media. **Four key features** for a future EU strategy in this area are proposed:

3.4.1. Capitalising upon existing legislative competences

The EU has no direct competence to regulate the use of gender stereotypes within the media. It does, however, have competence to regulate the internal market and an obligation to 'eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women' in all its activities (Article 8 TFEU) and this could be used effectively to create EU level standards for media products, overcoming the difficulty which Member States face that they risk causing disruption to the Single Market if they seek to act alone in this area. For example, a ban in Member State A on the use of sexually violent images of women in magazine advertising would be a barrier to the free movement of magazines containing such advertising produced in Member State B, where no such ban exists. As a result, the efforts of Member State A to promote equality between men and woman could, without EU action, be vulnerable to legal challenge as a breach of EU free movement law. An appropriate response for the EU would be to require through binding measures a high standard of gender equality in advertising *throughout* the Union. This would then enable Member States to meet the requirements of the internal market and the Union's commitments to gender equality simultaneously.³¹ More generally, it is suggested that a central aspect of gender mainstreaming within the single market should be '**gender-proofing**' **all legislation** that regulates the media sector in a way that ensures measures are taken to combat stereotyping where appropriate.

³⁰ Beveridge, F., 'Building against the past: The impact of mainstreaming on EU gender law and policy', (2007) 32(2), *European Law Review*, pp.193-212; Mazey, S., 'Gender Mainstreaming Strategies in the EU: Delivering on an Agenda' (2002) 10(3-4) *Feminist Legal Studies*, at pp.227-240.

³¹ Since stereotyping has been established as a root cause of persistent gender inequalities, legislation passed under areas of competence such as the internal market may legitimately seek to combat this. The Court established in *Tobacco Advertising* that the primary aim of single market legislation must be to eliminate genuine obstacles to free movement or distortions to competition but recognised that **flanking social policy choices** are an inevitable by-product of such activity. Given the obligation in Article 8 TFEU to promote equality between women and men, the case can be made that regulatory choices such as rules on media advertising should promote gender equality through actions that seek to eliminate gender stereotypes.

3.4.2. Deploying the full mainstreaming 'toolbox'

Gender mainstreaming is associated with a range of activities, encompassing both hard and soft law: concrete legislative action; target-setting; sharing of good practice; research and data gathering; education; awareness-raising.³² The complexity and cultural specificity of gender stereotypes and their impact, alongside the nature of media regulation within the Member States, requires a **carefully crafted strategy** that does not rely on just one regulatory approach, but deploys the full mainstreaming toolbox effectively. A survey of relevant literature suggests the following activities might be pursued:

Establishment of a media monitoring group. In 2010, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European Media Monitoring Group with a specific gender equality branch. It was suggested that this body should 'work on common European standards for defining degrading images and sexism' and 'receive and consider complaints from the public'.³³ This body could pursue other functions which would support complementary mainstreaming tools: for example coordinating a central repository of good practice, providing education and training materials, overseeing data gathering and research.

Representation of women in senior positions within the media sector. Whilst women are fairly well represented in the media in general, they are not present at decision-making levels.³⁴ Ensuring that women are appropriately represented in management positions within the media has an important role to play in breaking down gender stereotypes. For example, in Austria legislation exists setting a target of 45% women at all decision-making levels in the Austrian Broadcast and Television Company.³⁵

Education and awareness-raising. There is a large body of evidence pointing to the importance of developing positive gender identities in childhood, such that limited opportunities and negative perceptions are not carried into later life.³⁶ Moreover, the importance of ensuring that children, particularly boys, are educated in responding critically to violent imagery of women from a young age is fundamental. Whilst the EU is not competent to influence the content of curriculum in Member States, it has a potentially pivotal role to play in exchanging best practice for educational establishments. The European Commission has identified a number of positive awareness-raising initiatives that could be rolled out across Europe to promote positive and realistic portrayals of women and men in the media.³⁷

Ensuring dialogue with stakeholders. In order to challenge the culture surrounding gender stereotypes, key stakeholders within the media sector must be engaged. EIGE has pointed to the progress made by the European Commission in engaging the media sector in policy dialogue at European level,³⁸ a process that should be continued in relation to efforts to challenge gender stereotyping. This process should also include employer associations and trade unions to continue recent efforts to challenge gender stereotyping in the media through new workplace practices in that sector. Finally, civil society organisations, many of

³² Beveridge and Mazey, *ibid.*

³³ European Commission, *op. cit.* note 16, at 15.

³⁴ According to the European Commission (*ibid.* 6), in 2000 only 9.3% of women were in top management positions in the telecommunications industry in the EU and EEA and 3% of women journalists were in decision-making positions.

³⁵ European Commission, *ibid.*

³⁶ Crowley, *op. cit.* note 20.

³⁷ European Commission, *op. cit.* note 16.

³⁸ Crowley, *op. cit.* note 20.

whom have a wealth of data in relation to gender stereotyping, ought to be fully engaged in the policy formulation process.

3.4.3. Sustained use of dual-track approach

The “dual track” approach requires that initiatives and programmes designed with the sole aim of enhancing gender equality are complemented by a cross-sectoral strategy in which the position of women and men is considered in the design of all Community policies.³⁹ An essential aspect of this approach is to ensure that all policies in any area of EU activity are evidence-based and not informed by stereotypes. There is, therefore, an important role for the EU in coordinating and funding research into the impact of gender stereotypes across a range of policy areas.

4. GENDER BUDGETING

KEY FINDINGS

- Gender analysis should be an integral part of the EU budgetary process and the Multiannual Financial Framework. This analysis includes considering general macroeconomic targets as they are used to design EU economic and social policies (growth and efficiency).
- Gender budgeting represents a tool for achieving good governance standards (transparency and accountability).
- Gender budgeting is a particularly powerful tool to reveal and address the disproportionate effects of austerity policies on women by examining the corresponding fiscal and budgetary measures in a transparent way.

4.1. Gender budgeting in general

Budget is the most powerful governmental tool to plan future policies and actions. Budgets are **not gender neutral**: spending and revenue activities result in discriminatory effects on men and women.⁴⁰ On the other hand, a gender sensitive budgetary process, i.e. the so-called ‘gender budgeting’, could be used to set concrete horizontal gender equality goals across different policy areas. Similarly, the budgetary process provides an opportunity for reflection on the success of gender equality goals.⁴¹ Thus, ‘gender budgeting’ forms an indispensable part of gender mainstreaming.⁴²

³⁹ Commission, *Towards a Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001-2005)* COM(2000) 335 final

⁴⁰ Diane Elson, ‘Integrating Gender Issues into National Budgetary Policies and Procedures: Some Policy Options’, (1998) *Journal of International Development* 10(7): 929-41; Diane Elson, ‘Integrating Gender into Government Budgets within a Context of Economic Reform’, in Debbie Dublender (et. al. eds.) *Gender Budgets Make Cents: Understanding Gender-Responsive Budgets* (2002, London: Commonwealth Secretariat), 23-47; Rhonda Sharp and Ray Broomhill, ‘Budgeting for Equality: The Australian Experience’, (2002) *Feminist Economics*, 8(1):25-47; Janet Stotsky, ‘Budgeting with Women in Mind’, (2007) *Finance and Development*, 44(2): 12-15.

⁴¹ The Council of Europe, Directorate General of Human Rights, ‘Gender Budgeting’ (Strasbourg, 2005), p.8.

⁴² Kate Bellamy (2002), ‘Gender Budgeting’ A Background paper for the Council of Europe’s Informal Network of Experts on Gender Budgeting (UK Women’s Budget Group).

According to guidelines of different institutions and women's rights organisations, the basic good practices of gender budgeting include the following:⁴³ all state authorities, particularly those in charge of the budget, should be actively involved in gender budgeting; Civil society organisations and external experts should support the process by providing technical expertise and transparency; Officials involved in spending and revenue decisions should receive gender budgeting training; Gender budgeting should target all policies resulting in trade-offs between groups of individuals as well as policies that involve direct spending and revenue-making; Gender equality should be incorporated also into the audit and parliamentary discharge processes as a reflective mechanism to assess the success of gender equality targets.⁴⁴ To secure the commitment and cooperation of necessary state authorities, it should be underlined that gender budgeting represents a tool for achieving **good governance** standards (e.g. transparency and accountability)⁴⁵ as well as general macroeconomic goals (e.g. growth and efficiency).⁴⁶ However, this should not result in the overshadowing of gender equality by other policy goals.

4.2. State of play in the EU and proposals for improvement

At present, the EU does not follow a gender budgeting process, despite the calls of the women's rights organisations and the European Parliament.⁴⁷ The EU's budgetary process is suitable as a planning and reflection device for gender equality, due to the involvement of the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council. This is particularly so for the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework that provides a medium term projection of policy targets and spending plans for a period of 7 years. However, the three EU institutions must agree on **gender equality targets** for gender budgeting to be a smooth process. Thus, the lack of a gender equality pillar within the Europe 2020 priorities presents a challenge, whereas the Council's recent call for the building of a gender equality pillar within Europe 2020 is well founded.⁴⁸

The concrete targets set in the EU **Structural Funds Regulations** could be used as a starting point in the negotiation of overarching gender equality targets. This is subject, again, to the limitation that at present there is no common approach between the three EU institutions in terms of how to integrate a gender perspective 'into the thematic aspects and procedures of programming'.⁴⁹

⁴³ Bellamy, *ibid.*; Janet Stotsky, 'Gender Budgeting', IMF Working Paper WP/06/232; Nallari Raj, *Gender and Macroeconomic Policy* (World Bank, 2011).

⁴⁴ For instance the Council of Europe's model integrates gender budgeting into the planning and preparation, adoption, implementation, audit and evaluation phases; Council of Europe, *op. cit.* note 38, at 16. Lois Woestman suggests a similar model based on four stages in 'Engendering EU General Budget Support' (2009, WIDE, Brussels), at 5-6. See also Debbie Budlender, who suggests a model based on a 'triangle of players' (politicians, state bureaucracy and civil society) and on a 'triangle of goals' (awareness, accountability and change of budgets), in 'A Global Assessment of Gender Responsive Budget Initiatives' in Budlender (et. al. eds.), *op. cit.* note 37.

⁴⁵ See e.g. Council of Europe, *op. cit.* note 38, at 11-12.

⁴⁶ For instance Stotsky connects gender budgeting directly to the internalising of negative economic externalities. See, *op. cit.* note 40, at 13.

⁴⁷ European Women's Lobby, WIDE and CONCORD Statement, 'Towards a Gender Responsive, Accountable and Participatory Post-2013 EU Multi-Annual Financial Framework and EU financing Instruments', May 2011; European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 'The Multiannual Financial Framework from a Gender Equality Perspective' (2012, Brussels).

⁴⁸ Council Conclusions on Women and the Economy: Economic Independence from the Perspective of Part-Time Work and Self-Employment, Luxembourg, 19 June 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/143269.pdf.

⁴⁹ European Standard on Gender Mainstreaming in the ESF – implementation, <http://standard.gendercop.com/european-policy/implementation/>.

Ideally, **all European Commission DGs** that operate programs with potentially differing effects on men and women, and not only those directly involved in spending and revenue activities, should be active participants in gender budgeting. An external expert group as well as women's rights organisations should be involved in the process of gender budgeting to increase transparency and responsiveness.

The EU is not a welfare state; it does not implement distributive and redistributive policies; and its budget is miniscule compared to those of the Member States. Thus, for an effective gender mainstreaming process across the EU, **Member States** should also follow a gender budgeting approach. Gender budgeting experiences across the Member States have been patchy (see appendix II): unsurprisingly, Member States with a strong welfare state, including the Nordic states, Germany, Austria and Belgium have been pioneers of gender budgeting, whereas in Southern European states, such as Spain and Italy, there have been a few local initiatives without a national follow-up.

Positive experiences of the Member States, particularly those of the Nordic states, could be used as a model in the design of gender budgeting at the EU level. The EU does not have the necessary competences to require the Member States to make gender budgeting a part of the national budgetary process. **Incentive structures** could be introduced using the Structural Funds to encourage gender budgeting at the national level. Likewise, gender budgeting could be promoted using **soft cooperation mechanisms**, imitating the mechanisms of the Open Method of Coordination. A gender budgeting network between the Member States could be established as a policy learning mechanism, imitating the Nordic model.

However, these proposals require **dedication of public resources** at the EU as well as the national levels. Thus, they are subject to limitations imposed by austerity measures, as summarised below. Similarly, groups of Member States following different economic and fiscal models have experienced the crisis differently.⁵⁰ This might render difficult the adoption of a harmonised approach to gender budgeting across the EU.

4.3. Financial crisis, austerity and gender budgeting

According to feminist and globalisation literature, global neo-liberal economic pressures jeopardise gender equality policies, particularly in developing countries. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to suggest concrete measures for gender budgeting in the shadow of post-financial crisis austerity policies. Effective gender budgeting would require a fundamental reconsideration of the current macroeconomic targets and austerity measures.⁵¹

What can be said is that austerity measures have severely affected the institutional structure of gender equality in all Member States. Three Member States (Ireland, Greece and Portugal) are subject to strict spending conditions attached to their borrowing agreements by the IMF, EU and the ECB. Some other Member States which experienced a

⁵⁰ Vivien A. Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002); Vivien A. Schmidt, 'What Happened to the State-Influenced Market Economies? France, Italy, and Spain Confront the Crisis as the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly' in Wyn Grant and Graham Wilson (eds.), *The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis: The Rhetoric of Reform and Regulation* (2012, New York, Oxford University Press).

⁵¹ Diane Elson, 'Engendering Government Budgets in the Context of Globalization(s)', (2004) *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 6(4): 623-42; Stephanie Seguino, 'The Gender Perspective of the Financial Crisis', *United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, Fifty-third Session* (2009, New York).

milder crisis (e.g. the UK and France) have switched also to austerity as the underlying principle of public spending. Post-financial crisis fiscal mechanisms imposed strict budgetary discipline conditions on Eurozone members subject to monitoring and enforcement by the European Commission and the Council. Thus, a number of **serious impediments** mitigate against the promotion of gender budgeting by the EU as a part of gender mainstreaming at present: firstly, the legitimacy of such a policy would be strongly questioned in the Member States, particularly those subjected to strict budgetary and fiscal discipline by the EU itself. Secondly, the institutional structures in support of gender equality which should play an active role in gender budgeting have suffered severely from austerity measures in several Member States: for instance, in Romania and Spain gender equality bodies/institutions have been abolished; in Denmark, Ireland and Czech Republic they have been merged with other institutions; and in the UK and Greece they have faced serious budget cuts.⁵²

However, the need for gender budgeting is also particularly severe in the present financial climate, to ensure financial and budgeting measures **reflect the EU's commitment** to advance gender equality. Opaque intergovernmental methods and political bargaining between the Member States, the European Central Bank and the European Commission have been the dominant method for crisis management. Institutions managing the crisis have not been interested in the equality effects of their decisions. The equality effects of the austerity measures across the Member States should be subject to **systematic analysis** and this should become an integral part of the design of economic and fiscal policies in the future. This is particularly necessary in the shadow of contradictory data provided by different institutions: for instance, in its 2013 Progress Report, the European Commission argues that 'during the financial and economic crisis, women's participation in the economy and their contribution to family finances have increased, thereby decreasing the gender gap'.⁵³ However, according to women's rights organisations this reflects only 'the deteriorating employment situation of both women and men, and the sharper impact on male employment early in the crisis'.⁵⁴

Gender budgeting is a powerful tool to reveal and address the gender discriminatory effects of austerity policies: thus, it is particularly timely and necessary to introduce gender budgeting in post-crisis Europe. It is proposed that Gender analysis should be an integral part of the EU budgetary process and the Multiannual Financial Framework.⁵⁵ Effective gender budgeting would in the first place require a fundamental reconsideration of general macroeconomic targets and the fiscal and budgetary discipline conditions introduced by austerity measures.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

1. The dual approach to gender mainstreaming adopted by the EU in its Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-15 (the integration of the gender dimension

⁵² European Women's Lobby, 'The Price of Austerity – The Impact on Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Europe', 2012.

⁵³ European Commission Report on Progress on Equality between Men and Women 2013, Brussels, 14.4.2014 SWD(2014) 142 final, p.3.

⁵⁴ European Women's Lobby, op. cit. note 49, at 7.

⁵⁵ Stotsky, op. cit. note 40, at 15.

in all policy areas and specific measures) provides an effective range of tools to address gender mainstreaming and should be retained.

2. The development of a new strategy offers an opportunity to consider whether the priority areas in the 2010-15 strategy (equal economic independence, equal pay for equal work and work of equal value; equality in decision-making; dignity, integrity and ending gender-based violence, gender equality in external action policy, and horizontal issues) remain the areas of highest priority.
3. The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) offers improved EU capacity to monitor progress, identify good practice and develop good models and proposals.
4. Gender stereotyping prevents individuals from fulfilling their potential and can undermine economic strategies, anti-discrimination laws and other gender equality strategies.
5. Budgets are not gender neutral and result in discriminatory effects on women and men. In particular the budgetary disciplines imposed in response to the financial crisis may have had unforeseen or undesirable gender impacts which undermine progress towards gender equality.

5.2 Recommendations

Recommendations to the Member State governments and parliaments

Member States should:

1. Recognise the limited progress which has been made towards equality between women and men and continue to focus on this goal; develop further the mechanisms and tools which enable laws, policies and practices to be redesigned to better contribute to the achievement of this goal.
2. Take notice of the progress and weaknesses in gender equality evidenced by the Gender Equality Index and set ambitious targets for improvements in the short, medium and long term.
3. Ensure that national equality bodies and mechanisms are adequately resourced and that proper attention is paid to monitoring, gender training, evidence of good practice and the potential role of gender impact assessment (GIA) and gender budgeting in ensuring that rigorous and sustained attention is paid to the gender impacts of laws, policies and practices within Member States.

Recommendations to the European Institutions: the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council

All institutions should confirm their commitment to the Gender Equality Index (GEI) and contribute, in accordance with their competences, to incorporate targets relating to key aspects of the GEI into key policy areas and monitor EU progress against the GEI and the datasets which underpin it.

The European Commission should:

1. Further enhance its work related to the GEI through the Annual Report on Progress on Equality between Women and Men, and in sector-specific reports.
2. Continue to monitor progress towards equality between women and men across a wide range of policy areas and consider how monitoring activities can also improve communication and accountability for gender equality between the EU institutions inter se and between the EU, the Member States and stakeholder groups.
3. Utilise the expertise and capacity of EIGE fully to support progress towards gender equality, and consider how it can support EIGE to address gaps in the datasets used to compile the GEI.
4. Improve the Commission's own capacity for gender mainstreaming, including improvements in the availability, take-up and quality of gender training across the Commission's staff, the development of post-training activities and monitoring of the success of training initiatives.
5. Improve the EU Impact Assessment process to address concerns that it is weak in relation to social issues, including gender equality, and consider whether mandatory gender impact assessments could be required more extensively in key policy areas to achieve a clearer focus on gender in the policymaking process and to support Member States' progress towards gender equality.
6. Prepare a report on legislative approaches to gender stereotypes, addressing the need to ensure that Member States can take action to combat gender stereotypes in the media without causing unnecessary distortions of the Single Market, and fund research into the impact of gender stereotypes across a range of policy areas.
7. Gender-proof all future legislative proposals on media regulation to ensure that, where appropriate, measures to combat stereotyping are taken, and continue to support awareness-raising initiatives on positive and realistic portrayals of women and men in the media, including through dialogue with the media sector and other stakeholders.
8. To the extent permitted, make gender budgeting an integral part of the EU budgetary process with the help of an external expert group to increase the transparency of the budgetary process.

The European Parliament should:

1. Ensure that progress towards gender equality is monitored and that effective accountability for gender equality is pursued.
2. Use the expertise and capability of EIGE to support the Parliament's activities in relation to gender equality.
3. Support the Commission's 2010 proposal for the establishment of a European Media Monitoring Group with a gender equality branch to work on common standards for defining degrading images and sexism.
4. Incorporate gender budgeting into the audit and parliamentary discharge processes.

The European Council should:

1. Continue to monitor progress towards equality between women and men across a wide range of policy areas and consider how monitoring activities can also improve communication and accountability for gender equality between the EU institutions inter se and between the EU, the Member States and stakeholder groups.
2. Support the Commission's 2010 proposal for the establishment of a European Media Monitoring Group with a gender equality branch to work on common standards for defining degrading images and sexism.
3. Require and contribute to gender budgeting to become an integral part of the EU budgetary process and the Multiannual Financial Framework.
4. Take into consideration the gender effects of decisions made within the context of post-financial crisis economic and fiscal governance mechanisms, including the European Stability Mechanism.

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ANNEX I – SWOT ANALYSES

I. Gender Mainstreaming v. concrete measures SWOT analysis

Table 1 - Gender Mainstreaming (Art.8 TFEU) vs concrete measures (Art.157,4 and elsewhere) SWOT analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Through the European Pact for Gender Equality 2011-2020, the Council has reaffirmed its commitment to gender mainstreaming. The dual approach allows for focus to be directed towards priority areas while maintaining a broad mainstreaming strategy. Concrete measures, both general and specific remain important in particular circumstances where firm mainstreaming requirements are appropriate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy impetus in areas beyond selected priority areas may be weakened as mainstreaming may be perceived as being less important in these areas. Progress is patchy across policy areas and the commitment of some Member States to gender mainstreaming initiatives is low.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The creation of EIGE has strengthened the capacity of the EU to monitor gender equality and to carry out studies to support policy development, identify best practices and identify barriers to progress. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External economic environment may be perceived as hostile to gender equality policies and initiatives. Disaffection with the EU within Member States may make certain policy initiatives difficult in the coming period.

II. Institutional mechanisms SWOT analysis

Table 2 - Institutional Mechanisms, among which Gender Impact Assessments and Monitoring SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender mainstreaming is gradually becoming better understood and better integrated into policy development across the EU and in several Member States. The Gender Equality Index (GEI), underpinned by a vast statistical resource, provides a robust mechanism for monitoring the progress of gender equality across the EU and provides a unique opportunity for the EU to review its priorities, aspirations, targets and resources dedicated to the promotion of gender equality. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity and resources allocated to gender mainstreaming in Member States vary significantly and remain low in several Member States. Weaknesses persist in the EU's own Impact Assessment processes, particularly in relation to stakeholder engagement in drafting. Significant gaps remain in the datasets used to compile the GEI, particularly in relation to gender-based violence.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good practice, for example in GIAs and monitoring, is now in place in many policy areas and provides a solid platform for future capacity-building activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Austerity policies following from the financial crisis present a continuing threat to the maintenance of adequate institutional mechanisms for the promotion of gender equality.

III. The elimination of gender stereotyping and the role of the media SWOT analysis

Table 3 - The Elimination of Gender Stereotyping (GS) and Role of the Media SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainstreaming ideally equipped to deal with a complex issue like gender stereotyping (multi-faceted, multi-level, range of tools, dual-track etc). • 'Soft' initiatives associated with mainstreaming have considerable culture changing potential. • Media and advertising covered by aspects of free movement law, offering a 'hook' for hard law provisions on GS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research on gender stereotyping shows very worrying trends with potentially serious consequences across Europe – mountain to climb. • EU legal competence in this area is not 'strong'. • Lack of popularity of EU in MSs – potential for negative reactions to campaigns that do not respect national autonomy or are not sensitive to the social and cultural specificities of MSs.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cross-institutional support for action on gender stereotyping (Commission and EP – also EIGE and Council of Europe). • Existing body of research establishing negative consequences of gender stereotyping. • EU appropriate forum for 'soft' initiatives e.g. target setting, capacity building, monitoring, gathering statistics. • Growing public interest in representation of women due to new forms of media and current wave of feminism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interference with the media can be a politically fraught area. • Huge divergence within MSs in relation to the role of the state vis-à-vis the media. • In case of EU legislation, potential use of 'red card' by national parliaments if competence/subsidiarity not addressed. • EU level mainstreaming can be undermined if MSs do not implement/cooperate.

IV. Gender budgeting SWOT analysis

Table 4 - Gender Budgeting SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extensive EU legal framework of gender equality as framework for gender budgeting • Institutional culture of gender equality in the EU • As a result, less intense need for training of officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of common gender equality targets shared by the three EU institutions • Lack of a gender equality pillar in Europe 2020
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An extensive public discourse on equality and EU governance as a result of financial crisis • Women's increasing participation in work force as reversal of gender stereotypes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Austerity measures • Decreasing political commitment to gender equality • Lack of clarity in terms of austerity's effect on gender equality • Opacity in EU economic and fiscal governance

ANNEX II – POLICY EXAMPLES

I. Concrete Measures: Example

While the period 2010-14 has been characterised by little development in the *acquis communautaire*, future developments should not be ruled out. The issue of gender balance in company boardrooms, on which the Commission introduced a proposal in 2012⁵⁶, illustrates how attitudes in the Member States to the possibility of a legislative approach to particular issues can evolve over time. Growing evidence from Member States which have taken legislative action on this issue indicates the success this approach can have and the willingness of Member States to take action on this issue has altered significantly in the last decade⁵⁷. This example serves to illustrate why the EU should not rule out in principle the possibility of further developing the *acquis* in areas such as this where the approach and attitude of Member States has developed over time: specific measures remain a useful way of promoting action on specific issues and seeking to ensure a more even level of protection and promotion of equality across the Member States.

II. Monitoring: Example

The monitoring of specific areas of activity continues to generate valuable information about the implementation of EU policies and can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of activities and improve accountability, including the promotion of dialogue between EU institutions and Member State institutions.

For example, the 2013 Report on the Implementation of the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development 2010-2015⁵⁸, brings together information on the activities both of EU representatives and Member States, better enabling the Commission to encourage, support and monitor progress, identify and publicise good practice and identify gaps in implementation of its Plan of Action⁵⁹. Not only did this draw attention to the 'extremely slow' rate of progress on implementation of the EU Plan of Action, it enabled other bodies, such as the EU Council and the UK Parliament, to focus their attention on the issue and recommend further scrutiny. The European Foreign Affairs Council considered the issue at its meeting of 19 May 2014 and expressed its concern at the slow rate of progress identified.⁶⁰ The UK House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, considered the report in January 2014, expressing its concern and recommending continued scrutiny.⁶¹

This case illustrates the potential value of robust monitoring of specific initiatives in generating detailed information regarding activity and the evaluation of progress,

⁵⁶ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures, COM(2012) 614 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0614:FIN:en:PDF>

⁵⁷ For information on measures adopted in Member States, see European Commission, Factsheet 'Improving the gender balance in company boardrooms', June 2014, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_balance_decision_making/boardroom_factsheet_en.pdf

⁵⁸ SWD(2013) 509 final, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2017432%202013%20INIT>

⁵⁹ http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/SEC_2010_265_gender_action_plan_EN.pdf

⁶⁰ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142670.pdf

⁶¹ 29th Report, Session 2013-14,

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/83-xxvi/83xxvi.pdf>

communicating to a wider group of stakeholders the effectiveness and weaknesses of the current strategy, and improving accountability for delivery of EU strategies to both EU and Member State institutions.

III. EU Member State Experiences in Gender Budgeting

The following examples of state practice in gender budgeting illustrate the wide variation in experiences between Member States and also the existence of some positive experiences of Member States, particularly the Nordic states, which could be used as a model in the design of gender budgeting at the EU level.

- Nordic states have been committed to the process of gender mainstreaming, including a process of gender budgeting, as soon as signing the final document of World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Between 2004 and 2006 the Nordic states ran a cooperation project with a view to establish gender budgeting processes in the light of Council of Europe Guidelines.⁶² This project has resulted in permanent cooperation in gender budgeting. Nordic states also run an effective common information platform on gender equality.⁶³ They also have also bottom-up gender budgeting experiences orchestrated by local authorities, as exemplified in the experiences of the city of Göteborg in Sweden.⁶⁴
- In 2013, Austria enacted a constitutional amendment that makes gender budgeting a compulsory and permanent component of the national budgetary procedure.⁶⁵
- Since 2007, Belgian law orders the central government to integrate gender budgeting into the national budgetary process.⁶⁶
- In France a separate 'yellow appendix' analysing the gender equality effects is attached to the national budget.⁶⁷
- In Germany, the state of Berlin sets pace in gender budgeting together with a gender budget group in the light of the Law for the implementation of Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Budgeting adopted in 2002.
- In the United Kingdom, there is no legal requirement for gender budgeting. The Women's Budget Group, a voluntary organisation composing of gender equality experts, brings external transparency to the UK budget by critically analysing it from a gender equality perspective and publishing the results.⁶⁸
- Scotland has taken a horizontal approach to inequalities after the financial crisis in the light of the Scottish Government Report 'Coping with Change and Uncertainty -

⁶² Catharina Schmitz, Nordic Council of Ministers Report – Gender Responsive Budgeting in the Nordic Countries, available at http://www.ief.es/contadorDocumentos.aspx?URLDocumento=/documentos/investigacion/seminarios/politica_fiscal_genero/Seminario_Genero_Madrid_14abril_catharina.pdf.

⁶³ See <http://www.nikk.no/en>.

⁶⁴ National Commission for the Promotion of Equality of Malta (2009), Report, 'Gender Responsive Budgeting, at 41, available at <https://secure3.gov.mt/socialpolicy/admin/contentlibrary/Uploads/MediaFile/qrb.pdf>.

⁶⁵ Article 51 (8) B-VG/Federal Constitutional Act.

⁶⁶ Institute for the Equality of Women and Men, Manual for the application of Gender Budgeting Within the Belgian Federal Administration, 2010, available at http://iqvm-iefh.belgium.be/fr/binaries/Manual%20gender%20budgeting_tcm337-120670.pdf.

⁶⁷ Debbie Budlender, Gender-Responsive Call Circulars and Gender Budget Statements, UNIFEM, Guidance Sheet No.1, January 2007.

⁶⁸ See <http://www.wbg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/FINAL-WBG-2014-budget-response.pdf>.

Scotland's Equalities Groups and the Recession'.⁶⁹ An Equality Budget Statement is published with the annual budget with the assistance of external Equality and Budget Advisory Group.

- In Southern Europe, gender budgeting has remained largely a local initiative. In Italy, the Province of Modena, The Province of Genoa, and the Region of Marche carried out data collection studies in cooperation with private and civil society organisations with a view to highlight gender effects of revenue and spending activities. Similar projects have also been undertaken in Andalucía and the Basque Country in Spain. Nevertheless, in neither country did the central government follow up these initiatives to make gender budgeting a part of the national budgetary process.

⁶⁹ Available at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/18507/13477>.

ANNEX III: GENDER TRAINING IN THE EU

In 2012-13 EIGE carried out a project on Gender Training in the European Union and Croatia which has brought together a wealth of evidence on gender training across the EU and in International Organisations. The analysis and recommendations from this project provide a sound basis for the EU to consider, as it develops its Gender Equality Strategy for 2015 onwards how the EU might support gender training initiatives in support of its commitment to gender equality generally, and of its gender mainstreaming strategy specifically.

The EIGE project led to the publication of a 'Mapping of Gender Training Policies and Practices in the EU: Summary of Findings'.⁷⁰ Associated with this are Country Fact Sheets on training for gender mainstreaming in all the Member States and a data-base of gender trainers and training organisations in all Member States. The team also compiled an online database of gender training resources and some thematic reference sheets for policy-makers. These form a valuable resource for the Commission and the Parliament to improve their knowledge and understanding of the current state of gender training across the EU.

EIGE also published the report 'Mapping Gender Training in the European Union and Croatia: Synthesis Report'⁷¹ which offers an in-depth analysis of key aspects of gender training, including its importance to gender mainstreaming.

The Synthesis Report found that while there was wide-reaching and systematic training in place in a small number of Member States, the number of training initiatives remained low in the majority of Member States and training was often ad hoc. Training is not systematically offered to policy actors in EU institutions. Moreover, the quality and standard of training which is offered varies considerably.

This study found that the key reasons for the absence of systematic gender training were:

- Lack of political commitment;
- An absence of dedicated resources in equality strategies and action plans;
- A lack of incentives for public sector employees to attend training; and
- The impact of the financial crisis on gender training.⁷²

The study also points to several examples of good practice which could inform the development of a clearer EU strategy on gender training. A stronger gender training strategy could improve the effectiveness of the EU's gender mainstreaming activities and those of the Member States.

⁷⁰ <http://eige.europa.eu/content/document/mapping-of-gender-training-policies-and-practices-in-the-european-union-summary-of-findings>

⁷¹ EIGE, 2013

⁷² Synthesis Report, p.24.

ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND THE POSITION OF WOMEN ON THE LABOUR MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract

Upon request of the FEMM committee, this study examines the position of women on the labour market, drawing particular attention to factors behind the gender pay gap and the gender gap in pensions. The current crisis presents aspects that no other crisis has shown before. On the surface, gaps between men and women are being bridged but under the surface things are more complex and effects more diversified.

Overall, there is a need to introduce a gender perspective in the recovery measures: it would help to get out of the current situation sooner and better.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In EU countries a sort of marginalisation toward the working woman still reigns, which tends to occur in both a high concentration of women in low value-added activities and thus low remuneration, and major obstacles to achieving top positions within companies, even though the academic performance of women has been, for some years now, better than that of men. The Gender Equality Index (GEI) shows that the EU is half-way towards gender equality. The range of index scores shows the broad scale of variation throughout the EU in the level of gender equality achieved overall, with much room for improvement in the work and economic independence domains.

Women at work. The current crisis presents aspects that no other crisis has shown before. On the surface, the gap between men and women is being bridged but under the surface things are more complex and effects diversified among men and women. Gender gaps are closing not because women have improved their situation but because men saw theirs getting comparatively worse.

Quality of employment deteriorates because employers impose inferior conditions in an effort to curtail costs, or because employees are more willing to accept some worsening if it helps them stay in employment. The evidence available shows that the worsening of working conditions has spared neither men nor women but has affected them differently. It is also perceived differently, making debates on who would be 'more' or 'less' affected rather questionable.

Gender pay gap (GPG). The GPG in Europe has stagnated over recent years. Influencing factors are diverse, some of which tend to increase the pay gap while others may decrease it. Factors can be clustered into individual characteristics (e.g., education), establishment and industry characteristics (e.g., firm size), and institutional characteristics (e.g., minimum wages). Statistical evidence shows that:

- GPG is related in a complex way to women's labour market participation rates.
- Child rearing has a large impact on women's average wages. In some countries, women withdraw from the labour market when marrying or giving birth while returning after a couple of years. A re-entry mostly goes along with an allocation into lower paid jobs than women had before their career break, with an allocation into part-time jobs, or into dead-end jobs (so called 'women's child-penalty').
- Workers in unionised sectors are better protected against gender pay gaps and against poor compliance with minimum wage regulation. Recent studies show that sectors, which are traditionally unionised, tend to have lower pay gaps, such as the public sector.

Gender gap in pensions (GGP). Considerable research effort has been concentrated on gender pay gaps in working time. Although a generalisation to pensions is a natural extension, this topic has received little attention. Available data show that GGP is very wide: it is more than twice the figure of the gender pay gap indicator. However, there is no simple relationship between the two figures. Suffice it to say that Estonia (lowest pension gap) also has the highest pay gap.

In general, shorter careers are associated with larger pension gaps, though that relationship is not one-to-one. Distinguishing what was the 'dominant job' during one's

working life, the lowest gender gaps are met in the public sector (where they might even be negative), and the largest for the self-employed.

Towards a PINK NEW DEAL. The crisis may be a great opportunity for a historical change. The entire economic policy has so far ignored gender inequalities and might tend to ignore them even more now, due to the shortage of resources. By contrast, introducing a gender perspective in the recovery measures would help to get out of the current situation sooner and better.

Aim

This analysis looks at the main challenges concerning the economic independence and the role of women in the labour market in the EU. In particular, it focuses on the existing gaps between men and women, looking at the factors behind them. These include:

- gender gaps in the labour market (employment, unemployment, working conditions);
- gender gap in pay;
- gender gap in pensions.

The analysis takes into account the effects of the crisis and, in drafting policy recommendations, reflects existing good practices. Throughout the report, labour market segregation and women's broken careers are considered as important factors behind gender gaps, according to specific relevance.

GENERAL INFORMATION

KEY FINDINGS

- In EU countries a sort of marginalisation of women in the labour market still reigns; this tends to occur in both low value-added activities and thus low remuneration, and high-skilled occupations. There are still major obstacles to achieving top positions within companies, although the academic performance of women has been, for some years now, better than that of men.
- The Gender Equality Index (GEI) shows that the EU is half-way towards gender equality. The range of index scores shows the broad scale of variation throughout the EU in the level of gender equality achieved overall, with much room for improvement in the work and economic independence domains.

In recent years, the debate about welfare policy has paid more attention than in the past to vulnerable people, including women. It focuses on a series of measures to stimulate women's entrepreneurial skills, to reduce barriers to entry into self-employment, to support the rights of equality and empowerment of women, being aware that only a social model such as this could effectively halt the population decline, the aging of the population, and create a positive impact for the future economic and social development of the region.

However, what worries most is that **a sort of marginalisation still reigns in EU countries**, a segregation, both vertical and horizontal, towards the working woman, which tends to occur in both a high concentration of women in low value-added activities and thus low remuneration (such as poor tertiary), and major obstacles to achieving top positions within companies, despite the academic performance of women which has been, for some years now, better than that of men.

The **Gender Equality Index** (GEI) provides a comprehensive measure of equality between women and men relevant to the EU policy framework. The results presented in Table 1 show that the EU is half-way towards gender equality, although there are large differences between member states in how close they come to the equality point. The range across index scores shows the broad scale of variation throughout the EU in the level of gender equality, with the most problematic areas in the domains of power and time. It also shows that there is much room for improvement in the work and economic independence (money) domains.

1. WOMEN AT WORK

KEY FINDINGS

- The current crisis has aspects that no other crisis has shown before. On the surface, the gap between men and women is being bridged but under the surface things are more complex and effects diversified between men and women. This reduction of gender gaps is mainly due to men's situation comparatively worsening, rather than an actual improvement of women's economic position.
- The quality of employment is deteriorating because employers impose worse employment conditions in an effort to curtail costs, or because employees are more willing to accept some worsening if it helps them stay in employment. The evidence available shows that the worsening of working conditions has spared neither men nor women but has affected them differently. It is also perceived differently, making debates on who would be 'more' or 'less' affected rather questionable.

1.1 Narrowing gender gaps in the labour market

Key employment indicators show a narrowing of gender gaps in the EU. Although the activity and employment rates for women in the EU are still much lower than for men, there have been important changes in Europe over recent years, and especially since the 2008 economic crisis. While the activity rate for men remained stable between 2009 and 2013, the rate for women increased by about 2 percentage points (p.p.). At the same time, while male employment rate dropped by about 2.5 p.p., it remained stable for women. As a result, gender gaps in the **activity and employment rates** have narrowed (Figure 1).

Similarly, the gap between female and male **unemployment rates** has been narrowing. The gender gap in unemployment rates in the first quarter of 2008 was about 1.0 p.p., falling to near zero by the first quarter of 2013 (Figure 2). Nevertheless, recent figures show that unemployment is falling faster for men than for women and in several member states female unemployment rates remain at their post-crisis peak.

In the EU, the share of women in **part-time work** (per total female employment) is still considerably higher than for men (32% compared to 9% in the last quarter of 2013, and 30.5% compared to 7% in the last quarter of 2008). Moreover, the extent of female part-time employment varies considerably across the EU. Part-time work by women is most common in the Netherlands (77%), followed by Austria (46%), Germany (45%), Belgium (42%), the UK (41%), Luxembourg (40%), Sweden (38%), Ireland (35%) and Denmark (34.5%). Some of these also have high female employment rates (Figure 3).

While working part-time can reflect personal lifestyle preferences and positively contribute to the **work-life balance** of female workers, the high share of female part-time employment may also stem from **multiple constraints**, including family and care-related reasons (European Commission 2013, p. 185). Also, involuntary part-time can be used as alternative to lay-offs (see next section).

Conversely, very low rates of part-time work may also be problematic as they may result from **rigid working time arrangements** set by the employer or the legal framework (European Commission 2013, p. 226). This is the case in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary, where women's average working hours are as high as that of men, and where part-time work accounts for less than 10 per cent. In these Member States women appear to delay their labour market participation, as shown by **large employment gaps** between the 25-34 and the 34-54 age groups (Czech Republic and Bulgaria). This is most probably due to parenthood and is supported by evidence of a low nursery-enrolment rate among children below 3 years of age in these countries (European Commission 2013, p. 203).

1.2 Quality of work deteriorates as effect of the crisis

Economic crises heighten the risk that the 'quality' of employment will decline, because employers impose inferior conditions in an effort to curtail costs, or because employees are more willing to accept some worsening if it helps them stay in employment. Available evidence shows that **the worsening of working conditions** has spared neither men nor women, but has affected them differently. It is also perceived differently, making issues of 'more' or 'less' rather questionable.

Part-time working has risen during the recession, and it has been used in Europe to avoid the harder option of **firing**.² According to the results of the European Social Survey conducted in 17 member states to investigate working conditions during the recession, more than 10% of female respondents reported having to work shorter hours in 14 of these countries (as against 13 for men).

Given the use of shorter hours as an alternative to lay-offs, any increase in part-time employment during this recession may be considered as a mixed blessing. However, when workers identify themselves as **'involuntary part-timers'**, it is the sense of loss that prevails. In 2013, the share of involuntary over total part-time, for male workers, rose to 40.2%, up 9.9 p.p. from its 2007 level. Among women, the corresponding value is 26.3%, up 6 points over the same period. Country-specific patterns vary, of course, but those worst hit by the upsurge in involuntary part-time employment also tend to be those where there was more of it already (Figure 4). Specifically, **Mediterranean countries** such as

² See Hijzen A. and D. Venn (2011), "The Role of Short-Time Work Schemes during the 2008-09 Recession", *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, No. 115. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kgkd0bbwvxp-en>

Greece, Italy, Spain, and Cyprus have the largest share of involuntary part-time, as well as some of the largest increases for both genders. In percentage terms, however, it is **Ireland** that leads the league for increases, although its starting value was comparatively low among women. Nordic countries are more frequently found at the opposite end of the range to Mediterranean countries, while Eastern countries are found at both ends.

Unlike part-time, **temporary employment** is distributed fairly equally between men and women, with a slight prevalence of the latter (Figure 5). In EU27, men on temporary contracts reached 13.3% of total male employment in 2013, while the figure for women was 1 p.p. higher (14.3%).

It is well known that temporary employees are disproportionately concentrated among **younger workers**. Temporary employment may bring some advantages to young workers, including more opportunities to shop around for better jobs; however, this crisis has added higher cyclical sensitivity to the list of disadvantages for this type of labour relations. The average young worker on temporary employment in the EU experienced a **wage penalty** of 14.4% in 2012 in comparison with a worker on a standard contract with similar characteristics. Moreover his/her chances of transiting to a standard, indefinite-period work contract were barely over one third in the same year.³

This has an important gender twist. Temporary contracts may **preclude access to full maternity benefits**, for example if the woman becomes pregnant during a spell of unemployment. Moreover, uncertainty about the timing and conditions of the next (sequence of temporary) jobs creates a specific disadvantage for young women. It has been found that **fertility** is delayed when labour market prospects are unclear.⁴ While this holds true in good and bad economic times, for the young female cohorts affected by the crisis uncertainty may lower fertility altogether, since a postponement of a few years will significantly shrink a woman's reproductive period.⁵

³ See Samek Ludovici M., Platenga J. and C. Remery (2013), *Starting Fragile. Gender Differences in the Youth Labour Market*, ENEGE report, Brussels. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/130902_starting_fragile_report_2013_en.pdf

⁴ See Adsera A. (2004), "Changing Fertility Rates in Developed Countries. The Impact of Labor Market Institutions", *Journal of Population Economics*, n.17, pp. 17-43; Modena F. and F. Sabatini (2012), "I would if I Could: Precarious Employment and Childbearing Intentions in Italy", *Review of Economics of the Household*, 10(1): 77-97.

⁵ See Billari F.C., Goisis A., Liefbroer A.C., Settersten R.A., Aassve A., Hagestad G. and Z. Spéder (2011), "Social Age Deadlines for the Childbearing of Women and Men", *Human Reproduction*, 26(3): 616-622.

2. GENDER PAY GAP

KEY FINDINGS

- The Gender Pay Gap (GPG) in Europe has stagnated over recent years. Factors influencing the GPG are diverse, some of which tend to increase the pay gap while others may decrease it. Factors may be clustered into individual characteristics (e.g. education), establishment and industry characteristics (e.g., firm size), and institutional characteristics (e.g. minimum wages). The GPG is related to women's labour market participation rates in a complex way.
- Workers in unionised sectors are better protected against gender pay gaps and against poor compliance with minimum wage regulation. Tijdens and Van Klaveren (2012) study variation in the gender pay gap in 15 sectors and show that sectors, which are traditionally unionised, tend to have lower pay gaps (e.g. the public sector.)

2.1 The gender pay gap stagnates

Despite a sharp narrowing of the global gender pay gap between the 60s and the end of the 90s,⁶ the gender pay gap in Europe has stagnated over recent years. The latest figures show an average **16.4% gender pay gap in 2012**, with the figure around 17% or slightly higher in previous years (Figure 6).

2.2 Factors affecting the gender pay gap

To understand changes in GPG over time, one must realise that the factors influencing the GPG are diverse, some of which tend to increase the pay gap while others may decrease it. The impact of each factor may differ widely across countries. Factors may be **clustered** into individual characteristics, establishment and industry characteristics, and institutional characteristics.

Education, for example, is an individual factor. In most countries, workers with better education have on average higher earnings. Thus, if the share of high-educated women in the female labour force in a country increases faster compared with the share of better-educated men in the male labour force, the GPG will decrease.

⁶ Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) analyses more than 260 published gender pay gap studies for over 60 countries and finds that, from the 1960s to the 1990s, raw wage differentials worldwide have fallen substantially from around 65% to 30%. The bulk of this decline is due to better labour market endowments of women. The 260 published estimates show that the unexplained or discriminatory component of the gap has not declined over time. A study of the OECD countries for the period 1980 - 2004 reveals that the size of the GPG tends to decline in all countries for which data are available. Since the early 1980s, the OECD notices that the largest decline has occurred in the US, and that in Japan and the United Kingdom the gap is also steadily narrowing. Some countries show fluctuating trends. In Sweden, for example, the gender pay gap was 14.5% in 1980, increased to 19.6% in 1990, and decreased again to 14.8% in 2004. Cf. OECD (2007), *Society At A Glance: OECD Social Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Firm size is an establishment factor. In general, workers in larger firms have on average higher earnings. Thus, if, in a country, the share of women working in large firms increases faster compared with the share of men doing so, the GPG will decrease.

Minimum wages are an institutional factor. Assuming compliance with minimum wage regulation, these can be assumed to raise the wage floor. As more women are paid low wages compared with men, minimum wage-setting is assumed to decrease a country's GPG.

As far as institutional factors are concerned, a report by the European Commission from December 2013 on the implementation of EU rules on equal treatment for women and men in employment (Directive 2006/54/EC) found that equal pay is hindered by a number of factors. These include a **lack of transparency in pay systems, a lack of legal clarity in the definition of work of equal value, and procedural obstacles**. Such obstacles are, for example, the lack of information for workers necessary to bring a successful equal pay claim or including information about pay levels for employee categories (IP/13/1227). Increased wage transparency could improve the situation of individual victims of pay discrimination, who would then be able to compare themselves more easily to workers of the other gender.

The GPG is related in a complex way to **women's labour market participation rates**. Depending on the initial situation of a country, an increase in women's participation rates may affect GPG differently. If relatively large groups of poorly-educated women enter the labour market, the GPG will increase, assuming a stable stock of male workers. If relatively large groups of well-educated women enter the labour market, the GPG will decrease. Furthermore, in a country with low participation rates, on the one hand, the GPG may be low because the participating women might be well educated, gaining most financially from participating, as their earnings are relatively high. On the other hand, the participating women might be the ones with poor education and low earnings because they need to work to make ends meet. In this case, the GPG is expected to be wide, as concentration in low-paid jobs suppresses women's average wages.

In most countries, the increase in women's participation rates is predominantly due to the employment growth in the services sector and in the public sector. As Tijdens and Van Klaveren (2012) show, in many countries, the average wages in these sectors are higher compared to average wages especially in agriculture and manufacturing. Thus, countries witnessing these changes can expect a decrease of the GPG, assuming all other factors remaining constant. However, a strong **occupational segregation** may allocate women into the low paid jobs within these industries and as a consequence, the GPG may increase.

Child rearing has a large impact on women's average wages and thus on GPG. In some countries, women withdraw from the labour market when marrying or giving birth while returning after a couple of years. A re-entry mostly goes along with an allocation into lower paid jobs than women had before their career break, with an allocation into part-time jobs, or into dead-end jobs. This is called 'women's child-penalty'. Therefore, a raising share of re-entering women is likely to cause an increase in GPG. However, in some countries where women withdraw from the labour market and do not re-enter, the GPG is likely to decrease.

Workers in unionised sectors are better protected against gender pay gaps and against poor compliance with minimum wage regulation (Tijdens and Van Klaveren, 2012). Sectors that are traditionally unionised tend to have lower pay gaps, such as the public sector. Those with low unionisation rates and low wage levels, such as retail, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture, tend to have relatively higher gender pay gaps. This suggests

that these sectors suffer from low levels of compliance with minimum wage regulations. Male-dominated sectors such as construction have the smallest gender pay gaps. This is mainly attributed to the low numbers of women working in this sector combined with a relative higher level of education. **Domestic workers** show the lowest level of earning and the largest average gender pay gaps. This is mainly due to their low level of unionisation and the fact that many female workers live in the house of their employers, with an average wage in cash much lower than the one of their male colleagues.

3. GENDER GAP IN PENSIONS

KEY FINDINGS

- The gender gap in pensions is very wide: it is more than twice the figure of the gender pay gap indicator. However, there is no simple relationship between the two figures.
- Women in the past have worked for fewer years than men. In general, shorter careers are associated with larger pension gaps, though that relationship is not one-to-one.

3.1 Factors affecting the gender gap in pensions (GPG)

Pensions are **the single most important component of older people's income, especially for women**. Thus, they are an important determinant of the economic independence of their beneficiaries, meaning the capacity of an individual to lead an independent life and to take decisions for him/herself. In this way, differences in pension rights between women and men lay the foundation of gender differences between the sexes in later life as regards capacity for individual choice.

When examining independence for people of working age, we are naturally led to think about the gender pay gap. Focusing on gaps in pensions would be the natural follow-up (or sequel) to an interest in gender pay gaps. Those gaps would reflect the **accumulated disadvantages** of a career spent on a gender-biased labour market.

The structure of pensions is influenced by three sets of factors.

Long-term structural changes: ageing is obviously the most important influence, although echo effects of past employment also play a role. Today's pensions may reflect yesterday's employment as well as social norms such as divorce, widowhood, and cohabitation between generations.

Past pension reforms: today's pensioners are frequently covered by transitional arrangements. They will have lived and worked under one system and will in many cases receive benefits under another. Being a 'group stuck in the middle', they may not be protected by the internal operational logic of the system, whether new or old. As time proceeds, however, more individuals will be affected by new features and be vulnerable to new kinds of pension risks. Two reforms are most likely to have a **disproportionate effect on women**. Firstly, the switch in emphasis from public ('first pillar') pensions to occupational ('second pillar') pensions: the overall effect tends to tighten the link between

contributions and benefits (so called 'the privatisation of risk'). Secondly, the emphasis on working longer; although its rationale is unassailable, there may be hidden side effects in the medium term leading to lower pensions for those who do not respond to the incentives.

Short-term pressures connected with **the current economic crisis**: these pressures vary from country to country but could lead to important swings in gender effects; these could affect both occupational and State systems.⁷

3.2 Measuring pension gaps

Considerable research effort has concentrated on Gender Pay Gaps. Although a generalisation to pensions is a natural extension, this topic has received little attention. Does old age maintain pre-existing inequalities, does it cumulate and amplify them, or does it give a chance to level out life chances? The broad international literature concludes that GPG are the result of **three factors**: women participate less in the labour market; they work fewer hours and/or years; they receive lower wages.⁸ The 'bad news' is that these facts snowball women's career earnings. The 'good news' is that pay gaps have been shrinking in the past two decades, although progress has slowed down in recent years.

Does this mean that pension gaps will likewise start shrinking with a similar lag, and that therefore they are a problem that will correct itself? In Europe, this question has not been formulated; or if it has been formulated, it has not been answered. There exist a number of national studies with a focus on specific institutional features or reforms.⁹ The overall picture of where **Europe** is – and of where it is going – is essentially absent.

That is why it is so important to have an idea of the extent of the GGP in Europe: the indicator presented in Figure 7 consists of the difference in average pensions between men and women over 65, calculated in terms of pensions gross of tax (i.e. before tax is deducted).¹⁰

Taking the EU as a whole (weighted by population), men receive on average higher pensions than women by 39%. The widest difference is observed in Luxembourg (47%), followed by Germany (44%), and the UK (43%), which are clearly above the average. The Netherlands (40%), Cyprus (39%) and France (39%) are around the average. A large group of countries have values exceeding a third (Greece, Ireland, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria), while five other countries are around 30% (Sweden, Romania, Italy Norway, and Slovenia). It is thus true to say that in 17 of the 27 Member States women receive a pension which is **on average 30% or more lower than men's**. The EU average, being calculated on a population-weighted basis, is heavily affected by the gap of the larger countries, most notably Germany, the UK and France. Finland (25%), Poland (23%) and Denmark (19%) do fare better but still show sizeable differences in GGPs. The lowest values are found for Eastern European countries: Lithuania (15%), Hungary (15%), the

⁷ Cf. Corsi M., Crepaldi C. and M. Samek Lodovici (2011), *The Socio-economic Impact of Pension Systems on the Respective Situations of Women and Men and the Effects of Recent Trends in Pension Reforms*, EGGSI report for the European Commission; available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/document/index_en.htm

⁸ Jefferson T. (2009), "Women and Retirement Pensions: A Research Review", *Feminist Economics*, 15: 115-145.

⁹ See Horstmann S. and J. Hüllsman (2009), *The Socio-Economic Impact of Pension Systems on Women*, Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und Gestaltung (GVG), European Commission, DG Employment, Brussels; Brugiavini A., Cavapozzi D., Pasini G. and E. Trevisan (2013), "Working Life Histories from SHARELIFE: A Retrospective Panel", *SHARE Working Paper Series*, 11-2013.

¹⁰ All statistical evidence discussed in this part of the study is taken from Bettio F., Tinios P. and G. Betti (2013), *The Gender Gap in Pension in the UE*, ENEGE report for the European Commission - DG Justice, Brussels. Available at: ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/.../130530_pensions_en.pdf

Czech Republic (13%), Latvia (9%) and the Slovak Republic (8%). Estonia is 'top of the class' as women's pensions are only 4% lower.

To understand **how wide is the pension gap in Europe**, one needs a point of comparison. In the case of pensions, the obvious yardstick is the gender pay gap. Pensions replace employment income at an older age when that ceases, so the comparison is a natural one to make. It must be noted, of course, that today's pay gap and today's pension gaps refer to different groups of *people*. If evaluated *today*, pension gaps average income sources of a different *generation* than the one currently earning income in the labour market.¹¹ Nevertheless, in order to grasp orders of magnitude, it is important to see how the two gaps compare (Figure 8).

One first observation is that **pension gaps are considerably wider than pay gaps**: the average pay gap (16.2%) is less than half the average pension gap (39%). This is expected given that women work fewer hours per year as well as receiving less on an hourly basis. Thus a given pay gap is magnified into a wider *annual* earnings gap. In addition, women also work fewer years, and hence it can be expected an even wider *career* earnings gap.

Secondly, **no simple relationship** appears to link the two indicators. The country with the widest pay gap (Estonia) is the one with the lowest *pension gap*. A clearer picture of the relationship between pay and pension gaps can be derived from the scatter diagram linking the two sets of observations. Figure 9 in the annex plots pension gaps against pay gaps: the two sets of data cannot be linked with a direct *causal* relationship, as they refer to different people, i.e. a younger cohort working and an older cohort drawing pensions.

The scatter confirms the impression that there is no simple linear relationship between pension and pay gaps across countries; the line of best fit is almost flat and explains a tiny part of the variation ($R^2=0.034$).

3.3 Do pension gaps reflect broken careers for women?

An important hypothesis explaining gender gaps in pensions is that gender gaps in pensions are to a large extent a reflection of women's low and intermittent previous involvement with paid labour. In particular, especially in recent decades, a large number of **women dropped out of the labour force** in order to fulfil their family responsibilities. This may have reflected personal choice but may also have been imposed on them by insufficient childcare facilities, inadequacies in maternity leave, etc.

To **define** what a broken career means, and to classify women into categories according to labour force attachment, is quite a complex task. Following Bettio et al. (2013), it can be assumed that women with a number of years of employment greater than the median years¹² for their country do *not* have a broken career problem. To classify the remainder it

¹¹ In the study of ageing, a key distinction is between *age* groups and *cohorts* (i.e. people born at a particular time period). Today's 60-year olds (born around 1950) may behave differently than the 60 year-olds of 1990 (who had been born around 1930). At any one time, however, the two concepts coincide. One should always be careful of making generalisations based solely on age, as these may be due to a cohort effect and hence not hold in the future.

¹² The (un-weighted) median value of years in paid work in the EU as a whole (but excluding Sweden, Denmark and Finland which do not report this variable in the SILC survey) is 28 years for men, 21 for women, with little change if we average out the single country's median values in lieu of calculating the median at the aggregate EU level. For women, however there is considerable dispersion across countries: from 10 years in Malta and 16 in the Netherlands, to 29 years in the Czech Republic and 30 years in Hungary.

is sufficient to note that in those countries that base their system on social insurance principles, the cut-off for pension entitlement ('vesting') is usually 15 years. Thus it makes sense to define three groups: (1) women with years of employment between 0-15 years (distinguished into two subgroups in Table 2);¹³ (2) those between 15 and the median; (3) greater than the median. Many (perhaps most) women who have fewer than 15 years' work experience would have worked after leaving school and at the early stages of building a family; thus at the age of 65 their involvement in employment may only be a distant memory. Given that many pension systems have **vesting requirements**, a woman who may have worked in the 1970s for 4-5 years would, for social insurance purposes, be treated in the same way as someone who has never worked.¹⁴ Both would only receive an old-age pension, or a means-tested 'standard' pension at the age of 65. This is the reason for aggregating the 'never worked' group (0 years) with those with a few years of payments.

Table 2 shows the **classification** of women into the three groups. It further breaks down the low category into those with 0-10 and those with between 11 and 14 years' employment. In nine countries (Luxembourg, Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Slovenia), more than one in four women had been in employment for less than 14 years. On the contrary, in most Eastern European countries (with the possible exception of Poland and Romania), broken careers (in the sense of a large number of women with fewer than 15 years' work) appear to be less of an issue.

It can therefore be concluded that **broken careers** appear to be a major issue in explaining gaps in pensions. In almost all countries, women with a working life of less than 14 years exhibit a significantly greater Gender Gap in Pension income (Table 3).¹⁵ In **Germany** for instance, women who had been in employment for less than 14 years appear to have twice as high a Gender Gap in Pensions income (64.1%) compared with women with the 'median' working life (31.8%). The trend is also to be seen in **France, Austria** and to a lesser extent in **Spain**. The 'dominant pattern' holds with broken careers being associated with greater pension gaps; as years of employment increase, pension gaps shrink. However, in **Bulgaria** and in **Poland**, there appears no significant variation across different working life categories. **Greece** is the main exception where, remarkably, gender gaps are *higher* for women with the 'median' working life. This extraordinary result may well be an artefact of the fragmentation of the system into **occupational categories**, each with very different generosity. **Portugal** is a partial exception since it records the lowest gap among women having spent between 15 years and median years in employment.

¹³ If the years worked data were of better quality, or if there could be access to administrative data, it would have made sense to distinguish 'no work' with even a small number of years.

¹⁴ A recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-385/11 ruled that Spanish legislation on contributory pensions discriminates against women on account of the higher prevalence of part-time work and is thus contrary to Council Directive 79/7/EEC.

[http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= CELEX:62011CJ0385:Es:NOT](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0385:Es:NOT)

¹⁵ To apply this categorization in order to compute gender gaps for each gradation of broken career and in order to get around the problem that broken careers are an exclusively female issue, the average pension for women in each broken career category is compared to the overall mean pension for all males. In this way all three computed gender gaps in pension have the same denominator.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS A 'PINK NEW DEAL'

KEY FINDINGS

- The crisis may be a great opportunity for historical change. The entire economic policy has so far ignored gender inequalities and might tend to ignore them even more now, due to the shortage of resources. By contrast, introducing a gender perspective in the recovery measures would help all of us to get out of the current situation sooner and better.

At this particular time in European public life, it is worth focusing on the identification of useful tools to achieve real gender equality: to act only on the labour market, and its rules? Operate by specific forms of taxation? Or call into question the whole division of care work at home and outside?

From the answers to these questions, all to be formulated, a setting of economic policy could emerge, a "**pink new deal**", recalling the "Roosevelt" way out from the biggest recession in history, that of 1929. There is indeed a need of a **general plan of investment in social infrastructure** on which to base the economic growth of our countries. **Schools, kindergartens, universities, and care for the elderly are an investment that generates employment and encourages qualified female employment.**¹⁶ There is a large demand for quality services around Europe: if they increase, a growing number of women would be able to work outside the home, because the companies that provide them are often run by women who have shown they can stay on the market, despite the major difficulties faced in accessing credit at a time of credit crunch. It has been estimated that with a **gendered investment plan**, European GDP will increase gradually, reaching a level 2.4 p.p. higher by 2018 than without the investment plan (Hansen and Andersen, 2014).

4.1 Recommendations

National Governments and national Parliaments should fully acknowledge the scope for **fiscal policies to enhance female labour force participation** (FLFP). Taxation of labour income and government spending on social welfare benefits and pensions both affect labour markets similarly. They weaken the link between labour supply and income, thereby influencing the decision to participate in the labour market. Thus, the appropriate design of benefits is important to avoid disincentives to work. Elborgh-Woytek et al. (2013) outlines a wide range of fiscal policies to enhance the labour force participation of both women and men.

- Replacing family income taxation with **individual income taxation**. Empirical studies indicate that the female labour supply is more responsive to taxes than the male labour supply. Hence, reducing the tax burden for (predominantly female)

¹⁶ See UK Women's Budget Group (2013), *To Ensure Economic Recovery for Women, We Need Plan F*, Briefing note, www.wbg.org.uk

secondary earners by replacing family taxation with individual taxation could potentially generate large efficiency gains and improve aggregate labour market outcomes.

- **Tax credits or benefits for low-wage earners** could be used to stimulate labour force participation, including among women. These so called “in-work” tax credits reduce the net tax liability - or even make it negative for low-wage earners - thereby increasing the net income gain from accepting a job, and are usually phased out as income rises. In countries that emphasise the income support objective, credits are generally phased out with family income and are often conditional on the presence of children in the household.¹⁷ However, the phasing out of credit with family income results in high marginal tax rates for both the primary and the secondary earner in a family, creating strong adverse labour supply effects among secondary earners. By contrast, in countries that emphasise labour force participation, credits are usually phased out with individual income - the preferable policy to increase FLFP - as the marginal tax rate applied to the secondary earner will generally remain lower.¹⁸

Some examples of the practices existing already are shown in Box 1.

Box 1: Examples of good practices at national level

Enhancing Female Labour Force Participation

In the **Netherlands**, the increase in the female labour force participation rate (FLFPR) from about 35 per cent in 1980 to more than 80 per cent in 2008 can be attributed to a breakdown in barriers between full-time and part-time work contracts, in combination with well-compensated parental leave. Part-time workers benefit from the same hourly wages, social security coverage, employment protection, and rules as full-time workers, which also facilitates the transition from part-time to full-time status (ILO, 2010).

Sweden’s high female labour participation rate, with a gender gap of only 6%, is mostly attributed to a generous and flexible parental leave policy with a high coverage rate for child care, job guarantees, and eligibility for reduced working hours. OECD countries with the highest public spending as a share of GDP on child care and education services for children under the age of five have been found to have higher employment rates among mothers with young children (Aguirre et al., 2012).

Germany’s “Skilled Labour Strategy” includes measures to improve the availability of child care facilities and to promote more family-friendly working hours, in order to raise the FLFP rate (IMF, 2012).

In **Italy**, the reform of the labour market in 2012 (Law 92/ 2012, the “Fornero reform”, after the labour minister who promoted it) indirectly targets women having the aim of decreasing the variety of contractual arrangements for atypical jobs and reducing the improper use of some of them. This reform introduced a more universal system of social protection which widens the coverage of the unemployment benefit scheme; it facilitates transition from school to work and favours work experience for young people still in formal education. Moreover, it includes two innovative measures for the conciliation of work and family life: 1) compulsory paternity leave; 2) vouchers for child-care services (Rosselli, 2013).¹⁹

¹⁷ This is the case in France, Ireland, the Slovak Republic, and the United Kingdom.

¹⁸ This approach is followed in Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

¹⁹ It is too early to assess the impact of the whole package of the Fornero Reform, but a welcome novelty is the implementation of a well-organized system of data-collection to monitor its impact, which could be useful now that reform of the reform is already under way.

Targeting financial independence of women²⁰

In **Austria**, a means-tested minimum income scheme was introduced in 2010 as the successor of the system of social assistance. It is paid by provincial councils and envisages a minimum security payment oriented at the equalisation supplement reference rate of €747 (2009). The granting of minimum payments is coupled with the willingness to work if the beneficiary is able to. Positively, lone parents are granted a higher benefit than under past regulations to ward off the higher-than-average risk of poverty in this group. Means-tested minimum income payments were coupled in 2010 with the willingness to work if the beneficiary is able to work.

In **Belgium**, social assistance takes the form of a guaranteed minimum income called the Social Integration Income (*Revenu d'intégration social*, RIS). RIS is linked to a "right and duty" activation scheme that is obligatory for beneficiaries aged 18-25 and optional for other applicants. RIS is means tested, provided for as long as necessary, and varies according to household composition. The number of RIS beneficiaries has increased during the crisis, and women are the main beneficiaries. A specific, means-tested minimum guaranteed income scheme is provided to older persons (GRAPA), and women are the main recipients.

In **France**, during the recession, a new income-support scheme, the Active Solidarity Income (RSA), has been implemented. It can be seen as a welfare-to-work reform, encouraging income support recipients to participate in the labour market.

In **Luxembourg**, a basic guaranteed income (*revenu minimum garanti* or RMG) is provided either via an integration benefit²¹ or a supplementary allowance²² to individuals who do not have any income or whose income is below the minimum level set by law, either in an individual capacity or jointly with other members of their household. As of 1 January 2011, the basic guaranteed income amounted to €1,251.97 per month for a single person, €1,877.93 for a couple, €358.20 per additional adult, and a further €113.81 s for each child under the age of 18 who qualifies for family allowance.

Promoting equal pay²³

In **Belgium**, Parliament passed a law in 2012 obliging companies to carry out a comparative analysis of their wage structure every two years. Belgium was also the first EU country (in 2005) to organise an Equal Pay Day.

In **France**, the Government has strengthened existing sanctions against firms with 50 employees and above that do not respect their obligations regarding gender equality. For the first time, as a result of a 2012 decree, two firms were found in April 2013 not to have complied with the legislation on equal pay.

In **Austria**, the Equal Treatment Act obliges companies to draw up equal pay reports. The rules, which were phased in gradually, are now compulsory for companies with over 250, 500 and 1000 employees. Companies with more than 150 employees will have to produce a report starting in 2014.

In **Portugal**, a Parliamentary Resolution dated 8 March 2013 includes measures to guarantee and promote equality of opportunity and results between women and men in the labour market, including the elimination of wage gaps. The measures include reporting on gender gaps in wages by industry.

The Council should ensure the exchange of these good practices and issue, where appropriate, guidelines for the Member States.

The **European Parliament** should cooperate with and hold accountable the Council and the Commission for removing labour market distortions and creating a level playing field for measures that would help boost the demand for women's labour. Besides, it has to be taken into account that the norms that apply to women's participation in the labour market have a tangible impact on labour demand, FLFP, and thereby on macroeconomic outcomes. The persistence of gender gaps in pay (and pensions) shows that, despite significant

²⁰ Cf. Corsi M., Cipollone A., D'Ippoliti C., Samek Lodovici M., Sansonetti S. (2009), *Gender Mainstreaming Active Inclusion Policies*, EGGSI report for the European Commission – DG Employment, Brussels. Available at: ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6335&langId=en

²¹ The integration benefit is linked to assistance programmes for seeking employment, and job creation scheme and is paid to persons who meet certain criteria and are capable of working.

²² The supplementary allowance is aimed at persons who do not qualify for measures to promote integration into working life or who are temporarily exempt from these. It makes up the difference between the maximum amounts of basic guaranteed income and the means at the household's disposal.

²³ Cf. European Commission (2014), *Equal Pay Day*, Press release, IP-14-190, Brussels.

progress over time, gender-based discrimination persists. Indeed, **changes in legislation** and **social norms** in recent decades have supported an increasing demand for female labour and have made it possible for women to seek paid employment outside their homes and to contribute to family income. However, while **anti-discrimination provisions** have been adopted legally within all EU countries, some measures have proven difficult to enforce.

In this sense, the European Commission should propose policies to improve anti-discrimination enforcement, including (OECD, 2008 and 2012):

- Increasing the **awareness of legal rights to equal treatment** by conducting information campaigns.
- Providing the right **incentives**: a robust burden-of-proof framework can encourage discrimination claims before courts while minimising the risk for unjustified claims.²⁴
- Empowering **national equality bodies** to conduct formal investigations on their own initiative (without an individual complaint) can increase employers' awareness of equality issues and help potential victims of discrimination.

Last but not least, the **European Commission** should reconsider the formulation of **indicators of gender equality** to monitor the social impact of the crisis. The apparent improvement of many gender inequalities despite the deterioration of jobs, wages, working conditions, and income for men and women raises questions about the ability of these "gender gap" indicators to capture the trends of gender equality adequately during a recession. In this direction, and in line with the recommendations made by the Council of the European Union (2014), the European Commission should:

- Cooperate with EIGE to improve the quantity and quality of sex-disaggregated data and support further research on gender-relevant issues, including on women and men's perceptions of their role in the labour market and of the sharing of activities within the household, as well as their perceptions of working conditions and factors that limit opportunities in the labour market in EU-28 Member States.
- Review regularly the progress achieved on those critical areas of concern identified in the Beijing Platform for Action for which indicators have already been developed by EIGE, taking the outcomes of these reviews into account in the Commission's annual Report on Progress on Equality between Women and Men.

In this respect, the European Parliament as one arm of the budgetary authority should:

- Provide EIGE with the appropriate resources to keep on monitoring the critical area *Women and the Economy* (Area F) of the Beijing Platform for Action by using the existing indicators, and further developing and improving these indicators.
- Monitor and evaluate the correct implementation of EU legislation in the field of employment and social policy.

²⁴ The corresponding provisions of Directive 2006/54/EC would need then to be reinforced by accompanying measures like guidelines for Member States and enterprises.

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ANNEX: TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 5: Scores of the Gender Equality Index (GEI) (%)

Country	Index	Work	Money	Knowledge	Time	Power	Health
BE	59.6	66.4	79.3	54.7	45.3	45.2	94.1
BG	37.0	49.9	40.7	32.0	17.3	33.8	84.5
CZ	44.4	71.6	59.3	37.3	23.2	29.6	89.6
DK	73.6	81.6	79.2	75.1	64.9	60.0	91.8
DE	51.6	72.5	76.3	44.1	41.6	28.0	89.5
EE	50.0	64.6	49.1	53.0	51.4	27.5	83.8
IE	55.2	71.0	77.0	52.8	53.4	26.5	96.4
EL	40.0	59.7	63.3	36.7	17.4	24.4	92.4
ES	54.0	61.3	60.7	53.5	33.8	47.2	90.7
FR	57.1	67.0	75.9	49.4	35.8	50.3	90.6
IT	40.9	60.6	68.2	32.1	33.0	18.6	90.8
CY	42.0	68.7	74.1	52.9	25.3	12.2	91.1
LV	44.4	54.9	42.0	38.8	35.2	38.6	77.1
LT	43.6	61.0	41.5	47.4	24.1	32.1	84.9
LU	50.7	66.4	90.9	61.1	48.9	14.7	93.9
HU	41.4	55.9	54.4	35.1	32.5	24.4	83.7
MT	41.6	55.0	68.2	34.0	37.5	18.7	93.2
NL	69.7	73.1	82.5	65.5	71.3	52.2	94.7
AT	50.4	73.9	77.9	44.6	40.0	24.3	91.6
PL	44.1	61.4	52.2	44.0	20.9	34.5	82.6
PT	41.3	66.2	56.3	30.4	22.4	30.6	84.5
RO	35.3	60.4	39.0	28.8	17.8	24.9	84.0
SI	56.0	69.1	70.2	51.4	49.1	36.0	88.7
SK	40.9	61.0	53.7	35.0	17.8	33.1	85.8
FI	73.4	82.0	78.4	67.0	63.8	68.8	89.9
SE	74.3	78.6	80.2	66.3	63.9	74.3	93.1

Country	Index	Work	Money	Knowledge	Time	Power	Health
UK	60.4	76.6	74.3	68.8	43.2	35.2	95.4
EU-27	54.0	69.0	68.9	48.9	38.8	38.0	90.1

Note: The scores of the Gender Equality Index range from 1 to 100, where 1 is absolute gender inequality and 100 full gender equality.

Source: EIGE (2013).

Table 6: Classification of women over 65 according to broken careers status (%)


Country	0-10 years	11 – 14 years	15-median	>median
BE	39.5	3.4	7.9	49.2
BG	1.3	0.5	50.3	47.9
CZ	1.8	0.1	49	49.1
DK
DE	18.8	6.1	25.4	49.7
EE	0.8	0.3	57.5	41.4
IE	46.1		4.3	49.6
GR	26	1.3	23.1	49.6
ES	40.4	4.6	5.5	49.5
FR	28.6	4.7	17.6	49.1
IT	29.5	2.8	19.4	48.3
CY	43	3.5	3.9	49.6
LV	1.1	0.2	53.2	45.5
LT
LU	43.4		7.2	49.4
HU	9.6	1.9	42.4	46.1
MT		52		48
NL		50.3		49.7
AT	20.7	3.6	25.8	49.9
PL	11.3	1.7	38.3	48.7
PT	12.4	2.3	36.8	48.5
RO	15.4	1.1	35.8	47.7
SI	23.9	0.6	29.2	46.3
SK	4.7	0.5	50.3	44.5
FI
SE
UK	14.3	11.1	26.1	48.5

Source: Bettio et al. (2013).


Table 7: Gender gaps in pension by broken careers (%)

Country	0 – 14 years	15-median	>median
BE	37.8	43	18.8
BG	34.5	35.2	11.4
CZ	31	13.5	89.6
DK
DE	64.1	48	31.3
EE	14	8.3	-1.4
IE	43.4	..	26.3
GR	28.2	24.2	45.1
ES	39.9	41.8	26.8
FR	56.9	47.4	22.5
IT	41.7	37.9	20.9
CY	52.4	40.5	26.2
LV	12.8	14.4	3.1
LT
LU	59.2	..	33.8
HU	34.1	17.9	7.5
MT	23.4	..	17.3
NL	38.6	..	29.5
AT	50	43.1	21.3
PL	26.9	25.5	19.7
PT	51.3	16.5	40
RO	47.7	32.8	25.1
SI	50.7	31.1	11.5
SK	23	9.6	3.9
FI
SE
UK	50.2	47.3	36


Source: Bettio et al. (2013).

Figure 1: Activity and employment rates by sex, 2006 to 2013 (%)

Source: Eurostat.

Figure 2: Unemployment rates by sex, 2006Q1 to 2014Q1 (%)


Source: Eurostat.

Figure 3: Female employment rates (left axis) and female part-time workers (right axis) in the last quarter of 2013 by EU Member State (%)


Source: Eurostat.

Figure 4: Involuntary part-time employment as percentage of the total part-time employment by sex, 2007-2013

A) MEN




B) WOMEN




Source: Eurostat.

Figure 5: Temporary employees as percentage of total number of employees by sex, 2008-2013


A) MEN




B) WOMEN




Source: Eurostat.

Figure 6: Gender Pay Gap (GPG) in unadjusted form, 2008 and 2012 (%)

Source: Eurostat.


Figure 7: Gender Gap in Pensions (GGP), pensioners aged over 65 years (%)

Source: Bettio et al. (2013).

Figure 8: Gender Gap in Pensions vis-à-vis Gender Pay Gap (%)*

Note: (*) GPG data for Greece are missing in 2012.

Source: own calculations on data provided by Bettio et al. (2013); Gender Pay Gap from Eurostat's Earnings Database for 2012 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/earnings/database

Figure 9: Gender Gap in Pensions vis-à-vis Gender Pay Gap – Scatter plot

Source: own calculations on data provided by Bettio et al. (2013); Gender Pay Gap from Eurostat's Earnings Database for 2012 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/earnings/database

MATERNITY LEAVE, PATERNITY LEAVE, PARENTAL LEAVE AND UNPAID CARE WORK

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Abstract

Upon request of the FEMM committee, this analysis provides an overview of EU legislation and policies with regard to maternity and paternity leave, as well as parental leave, in the context of unpaid domestic work. Recommendations are provided on the need to further develop the EU-level actions regarding work-life balance policies in line with the principle of gender equality within the family and society.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite the EU's long-term commitment to gender equality, as demonstrated by strategies, benchmarks and legislation measures, comparative statistics on the Member States' populations' economic activity show persisting gender gaps in employment as well as gender pay gaps. This might signal that the EU initiatives have so far provided only limited results, mostly because solutions about work and family reconciliation policies are predominantly the Member States' domain. Moreover, women still perform a majority of unpaid domestic work, including care work.

The EU Gender Equality Strategy 2010-2015, together with Barcelona targets and related goals of the Europe 2020 strategy, addresses these issues. As proved by studies on fertility and female employment, an effective reconciliation policy package includes paid maternity leave followed by several months of parental leave, with individual entitlements for the fathers. The EU gender equality strategies and initiatives adequately deal with these findings. Achieving a more equal share of childcare was one of the main factors behind the EU Parental Leave Directive which (in its present form) obligates the Member States to provide individual and non-transferable entitlements to at least one month of the parental leave to the father (whereas 4 months of the parental leave for both parents altogether). While the strength of this legal solution is that it is legally binding for all the Member States, it also leaves room for interpretation regarding paternity leave and, therefore, the Directive has been implemented in various versions, often as an unpaid part of the leave, thus with only weak impact on father's share of the leave. Consequently, most of the entitlements to parental leave are used by mothers. While the provisions of parental leave vary within the EU, long parental and childcare leave (about three years) proved to impede maternal employment, especially when the incentives for fathers to share the leave are weak or do not exist at all.

Furthermore, the research on the impact of childcare and family policies showed a positive relation between availability of high-quality childcare services and female employment. The European Council has for long recognised this link by including the development of childcare services in the list of Barcelona targets. As reported by the Commission in 2013, only 10 Member States achieved the Barcelona targets with regard to the provision of childcare services for children under the age of three, while the situation worsened in several Member States due to the effects of the economic crisis. The Commission enhanced its commitment to childcare services as monitoring childcare services has become part of the European Semester.

Recommendations for the post-2015 EU strategy for gender equality should include strengthening of individual and non-transferable parental leave entitlements for men as part of EU law. Besides, the Commission might consider establishing a more coherent and institutionalised system of monitoring the implementation of the Parental Leave Directive, especially in the Eastern European countries, where the Directive has been only partially implemented or not implemented at all. Additionally, the EU post-2015 strategy should include enhancement and monitoring of the availability of childcare and elderly care services, with a focus on the services' quality and affordability. Finally, the new strategy should focus even more on the situation of the vulnerable groups as single parents (mostly mothers), young women and men entering the labour market, and immigrants.

BACKGROUND

Work-life balance or the reconciliation of work and family, as provided by state policies, have been regarded the most important factor influencing female economic activity (Hobson, Fahlén, and Takács 2011; OECD 2011; Esping-Andersen 2009; OECD 2011). Thus, benchmarks regarding parental leave policies and care services have related to gender equality goals and strategies, as well as being included in the EU legislation. As far as parental leave provisions are concerned, the legislation (EU Council Directives) provide minimum standards that must be adopted to the national systems (given that such solutions may not have so far been in place).

Recognizing the new needs of families, the Commission proposed related actions with regard to the reconciliation of work and family. In 2008, a **work-life balance package** was proposed in order to stimulate the balancing of professional and family life, and increase participation in the labour force, especially for women (EC 2008). Among others, the Commission announced the working on strengthening women's entitlements to leave for family reasons (extending the maternity leave), and to assure the equal treatment of the self-employed and their spouses. Furthermore, while formulating the goals for the **Strategy for Equality between Women and Men 2010-2015**, the Commission recommended the following: "assess remaining gaps in the entitlement to family-related leave, notably paternity leave and carers' leave, and the options for addressing them" (EC 2010).

In this sense, the Strategy complements the EU2020 headline target of reaching an employment rate of 75% and qualifies the need to facilitate the work-life balance or reconciliation policies as the most important precondition for increasing the female labour force participation. However, as has been noticed by some scholars, there is some **imbalance** between the two issues with reduced attention to gender equality and gender mainstreaming compared to employment for reaching the overall aim of smart, inclusive and sustainable growth (Villa and Smith 2014). Nevertheless, the references to gender equality in the context of the reconciliation policies were present in the responses from 16 Member States to the Commission's consultation on Europe 2020 who independently related the new strategy to enhancing gender equality, including reconciliation and work and life balance, as well as leave for family reasons (Sweden, *ibid.*). Still, the present EU employment strategy does not specify a separate target for women with consequently a smaller emphasis on the need to reform work-life balance systems in order to enhance equal opportunities for men and women. In the previous employment strategy - Lisbon Strategy - a separate benchmark for female employment was set at the level of 60%, and this threshold was almost reached in 2008 and was equal to 59.1%.

The next section presents the employment situation of the EU Member States and how this is related to the issues of work-life balance. This is followed by the analysis of the EU legislation with regard to parental leave system, flexible working time arrangements, Barcelona targets, as well as ageing and the new caring needs of family and society, with the overall emphasis on the issues of unpaid work.


1. SETTING THE SCENE: GENDER EMPLOYMENT GAPS AND WORK-LIFE BALANCE

KEY FINDINGS

- Though female employment rates continued to grow in the last decade, persistence of gender gaps could also be observed; moreover, the more nuanced analysis shows significant differences between the Member States;
- Employment rates of young women (15-29) grow slower than employment rates of older cohorts of women;
- The presence of children in a household negatively impacts the employment of women. Countries that made progress in terms of younger women's employment demonstrates that it has been facilitated by reforms in other policy fields than employment, most notably in the sphere of institutional care and adequate parental leave arrangements.

The **general employment levels** in the EU increased only slightly between 2000 and 2013. There are a number of EU Member States which did not meet the targets in 2010 and will face the challenge of reaching the redefined targets by 2020. While the economic crisis has to be taken into account in this respect², it is important to notice that, in some countries of the EU, the employment possibilities for women are reduced due to the unavailability of childcare. It is argued that the Barcelona targets for enrolment rates for children in two age groups were to serve as the incentive for the Member State to provide more care and, hence, facilitate female employment (more in section 4.2).

Figure 10: The employment rate of women and men (20-64) in European Union Member States, 2013.



Source: Eurostat LFS.

As can be clearly seen, the levels of employment vary between the countries, with the lowest women's rates being observed in Southern European states, such as Greece,

² For information on employment rates during the crisis see Annex tables.

Croatia, Malta, Italy and Spain. At the other end of the spectrum, Germany, Denmark and Sweden are located, with female employment rates exceeding 72%. Notably, only one country, Sweden, reached the **Europe 2020 target** in the case of women, while in the case of men, ten countries did so. In terms of the employment gap, it is the highest in Malta (29.6 pp.), Italy and Greece (19.9pp. and 19.6pp. respectively). The lowest gaps are found in the countries of Northern Europe: Lithuania, Finland, Latvia and Sweden, but also Bulgaria (which has a total employment rate below the EU average). It is worth noting that notably young women experienced a relatively slow growth in employment, extending a trend existing already before the crisis. The major driver of the employment rate defined in Europe 2020 was the older cohorts, women over the age of 45 (Lewandowski et al. 2013). It is hard to judge whether in the absence of the crisis, the Member States would have had a faster dynamics for the employment rate growth, which would allow some countries to reach the Europe 2020 targets. This has to do with the inherent conflicts in the Lisbon strategy, repeated in the Europe 2020 assumptions – the fiscal stability on the one hand, and social cohesion on the other (Marlier, Natali, and Van Dam 2010).

One of the most important factors influencing the employment rate of women is their activity related to **child-birth and child-rearing**. The employment rate of women with children under the age of 12, compared to the values of childless women, is significantly lower (see Table 1 in Annex). The reverse phenomenon can be identified in the case of European men. The employment rate of men is higher when they have a child, which results in an employment rate increase of approximately 9 percentage points on average. These two overlapping effects contribute to a **significant gender employment gap in households with small children**. Also, there exists a substantial gender gap when it comes to the share of the full-time employment in total employment. Accordingly, the gap reached 23 percentage points (EU-28 average) in 2013 (Eurostat data).

A particular case of the parents' employment situation concerns the **single parent household**. Here, the "motherhood penalty" (Correll, Benard et. al. 2007) is aggravated by the status of the household: the maternal employment increases with the age of the child in both types of households, however such growth is still impeded in single-mother households. On average, in employment terms it means that the employment rate of single mothers remains lower than mothers with partners in all age groups. A specific case is young single mothers (15-29), whose employment tends to be higher compared to single childless women in countries like Lithuania, Italy or Greece (the difference of approximately 20 percentage points), but significantly lower in Germany or the United Kingdom (12-13 percentage points in difference). The differentiation between full-time and part-time employment brings a fuller picture of the phenomenon. Accordingly, single mothers face a higher probability to be employed part-time, while in the case of childless single women, the probability is higher to be employed full time. An interesting exception to this rule is the Netherlands, where single mothers work more full time than childless single women (Ruggeri and Bird 2014).

2. MATERNITY, PATERNITY AND PARENTAL LEAVE

KEY FINDINGS

- The 14 weeks' duration of maternity leave standard set by the Council Directive 92/85/EEC reflects the worldwide established minimal standard with which all Member States comply. The implementation is uneven with most of the East Central European countries (ECE) providing at least 18 weeks of maternity leave.
- There is a variety of solutions with regard to parental leave within the EU but it is still women who take the leave for family reasons.
- The Parental Leave Directive is being implemented in a way that is unlikely to modify men's behaviour. Most importantly, this is when the father-only part of the leave comes *without* adequate financial compensation.
- Father's involvement in care activities enhances gender equality at home and positively influences decisions about having children.
- The need for strengthening common standards is apparent after reviewing the variety of solutions applied by the Member States.

Maternity leave usually means a direct pre- and post-natal break from employment for the mother of a newly born child. This entitlement is most often regarded as a typical maternal right and associated with the biological consequences of pregnancy: recovery after giving birth to a child plus the first, intensive period of breastfeeding. Therefore, the weeks before and after the birth are reserved for the mothers, with some special entitlements for the fathers. **Postnatal paternity leave** is usually parallel to maternity leave and marks a "time out" of work that is reserved only for the fathers.

At the same time, **parental leave** would refer to any kind of leave that is available after the first immediate post-natal leave and is usually available to both parents. It is important to note, that paternity leave is distinct from the **father's quota of the parental leave** that marks the part of parental leave that is only reserved for the father (the second parent), i.e. this is the father's individual and non-transferable entitlement. Nordic countries are usually regarded as pioneering in the provision of individual entitlements for the fathers – the first "daddy month" was introduced in Norway in 1993, and was followed by Sweden soon after. Another type of leave is **childcare leave** – a break from work taken for the care of a child at home. However, at the EU level, maternity, paternity and parental leave have received most of the attention.

2.1. Maternity and paternity leave

2.1.1. Existing framework and legislative plans

With regard to the EU legislation on **maternity leave**, Council Directive 92/85/EEC (the so-called Maternity Leave Directive)³ obligates the Member State to provide at least **14 continuous weeks** before and/or after delivery, while the two weeks before the childbirth must take place. The mother should also be entitled to an **adequate allowance**, i.e. payment that would compensate the break from employment at the level that “guarantees income at least equivalent to that which the worker concerned would receive in the event of a break in her activities on grounds connected with her state of health”, although also **subject to national legislation and ceilings**. Additionally, the Directive guarantees protection from discriminatory dismissal. The mother must keep her employment status from the beginning of her pregnancy until the end of the duration of the leave.

In **2008**, the **European Commission published a proposal amending Directive 92/85/EEC**⁴. The proposal adhered to other EU strategies and documents, including the above mentioned Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and the European Pact for Gender Equality. The key changes included extending the leave’s duration **from 14 to 18 weeks**. The main justification for the modified duration of the leave was to “help the worker to recover from the immediate effects of giving birth, while also making it easier for her to return to the labour market at the end of her maternity leave”⁵. Apart from using the compulsory part of the leave, (six weeks after the delivery), the woman would have the opportunity to use the remainder of **the leave with more flexibility**, before and after the leave. While using the leave, the mother would also receive an allowance covering her **full monthly salary** received prior to the maternity leave – an improvement as compared to the regulations in place at the time. Furthermore, the proposal **strengthened the protection of the worker’s employment**, and it extends beyond the moment of returning after using the leave. Thus, an amended Directive would oblige the employer to provide justification in writing for the dismissal of a woman within six months after she returns from maternity leave.

The **European Parliament** (EP) adopted its first reading in this ordinary legislative procedure on 20 October 2010⁶. The plenary resolution was based on the Report prepared by Edite Estrela (S&D) on behalf of the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (**FEMM**).⁷ Among others, the amendments should enhance the work-life balance of

³ Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 concerning the implementation of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth and women who are breastfeeding.

⁴ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 October 2008 amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding [COM(2008) 637 final - Not published in the Official Journal]. The proposal was part of what the Commission called “Work-life balance package, see Commission MEMO 08/603.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Formerly: Co-decision procedure (COD).

⁷ Second report on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (COM(2008)0637 – C6-0340/2008 – 2008/0193(COD)) and the European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 October 2010 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (COM(2008)0637 – C6-0340/2008 – 2008/0193(COD)).

employees with children, **both mothers and fathers**, in a similar way in across EU Member States to assist those faced with a severe demographic downfall. One of the opening statements of the report underlines that “human reproduction must concern men and women”.⁸

In the first place, the resolution proposed to further **extend maternity leave to 20 weeks**, suggesting that the longer duration of the leave would benefit breastfeeding mothers⁹ and would allow for a full recovery after the childbirth. It also introduced **paternity leave** (at least two weeks) as an individual and non-transferable entitlement that should also be available to non-married couples. Furthermore, the EP suggested extending the scope of the Directive to adopted parents and to workers “employed by **any type of contract**, including domestic work” and including **flexible working time arrangements**. Protection against dismissal would be further strengthened by obligating the Member States to introduce an effective system of **sanctions and compensation** in the case of unlawful dismissal. The report also explicitly stated that the wage replacement rate of maternity leave allowance should amount to at least 100%. The EP proposed that during the compulsory six weeks of the leave, only the woman should receive the wage replacement, regardless of her employment record. During the remainder of the leave, the wage replacement could be shared between the parents, according to their preferences.

Finally, the revised Directive’s goal is also to strengthen **health and safety measures** with regard to the **reproductive health of both women and men**. It would be the responsibility of the employer to “include an assessment of the reproductive risks for male and female workers”.¹⁰

Since 2010, the Council has not developed a common position for negotiations with the EP nor even given a mandate to the successive Presidencies to start negotiations on an informal level. Consequently, the Commission proposed in July 2014 to withdraw the proposal. The **withdrawal** is pending given the intentions of the Italian Presidency to move the file forward. The EP has, in the meantime, appointed a new rapporteur, Alessandra Moretti (S&D).

The other legislative proposal of the work-life balance package amended an existing Directive and was adopted on 7 July 2010¹¹. It improves the social security of women working in a self-employed capacity. Importantly, the new legislation grants self-employed women the right to use at least 14 weeks of maternity leave (on a voluntary basis) that should also be accompanied by an adequate payment. It covers also those women who assist their husbands/partners with their business activities ('assisting spouses').

2.1.2. Evaluation and analysis

The Maternity Leave Directive, which is currently in force seems to represent a relatively firm instrument, standardizing maternity leave provisions and protection against dismissal from employment. The Directive sets some minimum standards among which requiring from Member States to provide some form of allowance to women on maternity leave.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The report refers to the World Health Organisation recommendation of 16 April 2002 on a global strategy on infant and young child feeding, which suggests that exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of a child's life guarantees optimum growth and development (a period of 20 weeks is set as a minimum requirement).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC

However, the tentative withdrawal of the proposal to amend the Directive of 1992 should be regarded as a **step back** on the way to achieve more effective instruments of work-life balance and gender equality in childcare and other unpaid domestic work.

Firstly, for a long time, the 14 weeks' duration of **maternity leave standard** set by the International Labour Organization (ILO) has been the worldwide established minimal standard which also all Member States have adopted. However, ILO Recommendation 191 in connection with the Maternity Leave Convention (Convention 183) of 2000 recommends lifting the standard to 18 weeks of maternity leave. As noted recently by the ILO, more than a half of 185 countries under their study provided at least 14 weeks of maternity leave in 2013, while 42 countries reached or exceeded the recommended leave's duration, i.e. 18 weeks (for extensive information on maternity leave and benefit system in different countries, see ILO 2014). While all of the EU countries meet the standard of 14 weeks, the adoption of the recommended standard is uneven in the EU with most of the **East Central European countries** (ECE) providing at least 18 weeks of maternity leave. In this respect, the proposal to amend the existing Directive shows that the Commission assumed to take the lead in the implementation of the new international standard in all Member States.

The proposed duration of a maternity leave of 20 weeks, adopted by the European Parliament, on the other hand, would be in line with the WHO standards with regard to breastfeeding. As some studies suggest, apart from the period of the leave before the confinements, mothers would need to stay with the child at least 4 months after the birth in order to develop the necessary attachment to her child and essential parenting skills. It should also be noted that most mothers in European societies would like to stay at home for 6 months following the childbirth to breast-feed their children (Saxonberg 2013).

Secondly, the need for developing an attachment and parenting skills should not only be the right of the mother, as **fathers** should have an equal opportunity to stay with their children during the first weeks and/or months after the childbirth. The **gender differentiation of care responsibilities** is especially visible, when the work interruption related to the care for a child is taken into account. In 2010, the proportion of men who stopped their work in order to take care of a child excluding maternity and paternity leave, did not exceed 2% for the EU28, while in the case of women this proportion was approximately 20 times higher (40%) (Miani and Hoorens 2014). Moreover, the father needs to be present at home in order to provide childcare and home duties, as nowadays the organization of the housework and the mode of how the household operates should not only be the burden of the mother. However, the Directive in force does not cover the individual father's rights to paternity leave that might be used immediately after the confinement, which remains a **weakness** in the existing solutions. It is clear, that amendments included in the draft proposal for the revision of the Directive would represent a step forward on the way to achieve more gender balance in care work.

Thirdly, the income guarantee in its present form does not seem to be sufficient and instead, **the full pay norm** occurs as a more appropriate measure. Taking a break from work with only the minimal payment or without any income support during the leave in case of fathers (see Annex Table 1) would increase financial insecurity that families often experience when bringing a new child into the household. Moreover, paternity leave is only taken, when the families do not lose the **father's income**, therefore, a lack of appropriate income during the leave represents a disincentive for using it. The case of **Estonia** demonstrates the importance of income replacement during paternity leave: the take up of paternity leave fell significantly during the period when the benefit attached to paternity

leave was abolished between 2009 and 2013. In **Finland** the percentage of fathers on paternity leave increased from 40% in 1990 to 84% in 2012 (also see Annex Table 3).

Fourthly, the additional amendments with regard to the **flexible work conditions**, enhanced protection against dismissal, and extending the Directive to any type of contract would also be needed for updating the EU standards in work-life balance policies. to counter the common practice of employers to offer short-term contracts to young men and women with less social protection and excluding them from the rights attached to motherhood and parenthood. This is especially important with regard to young people that are making the transition from education to employment and who are forced to start a family only when having a secure, standard employment contract¹². For example, Spain is one of the countries with the highest rates of fixed term contracts and it turns out that the take-up of the existing paternity leave has dropped recently when compared to the number of children born, as those Spanish fathers, who work part-time or on a temporary contract tend not to be eligible for using the leave (Escobedo, Meil, and Lapuerta 2014).

Against the backdrop of these arguments, it has to be concluded that the lack of the standard is the basic **weakness** of the EU policy with regard to the minimum post-natal **paternity leave**. A large number of EU countries have already introduced paternity leave that is either obligatory for a certain period of time (for example 10 days of the obligatory leave in Portugal) or functions as an individual, non-transferable right and almost always comes with payment at a high level of wage replacement rate. The paternity leave of at least 10 days functions in Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the UK. Several countries introduced solutions allowing mothers on maternity leave to transfer part of the leave to the fathers voluntarily, i.e. without any additional incentives, in the Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Spain and the UK, although Poland, Spain and Croatia have separate paternity leave schemes.

The **Southern European countries** are divided with regard to the provision of special incentives for the fathers. Italy and Greece give only one day (Italy) or two (Greece) days of the paid leave for the father. Malta extended the individual entitlements from one to three months recently, but there is no statutory paternity leave apart from one day of the birth leave for the father. Unlike Italy, Malta and Greece, Spain and Portugal provide wider entitlements for the fathers – while, so far, 15 days of paid leave are available for the fathers in Spain, the government plan is to extend this period to 30 days from January 2015 (for a review of provision of paternity leave and father's only leave in Annex Table 2).

One strategic **opportunity** for the EU institutions to continue the work on amending the Maternity Leave Directive would be to look for allies among the ECE countries that already have longer periods of maternity leave. In addition, some of these countries recently introduced individual entitlements for the fathers with regard to post-natal paternity leave: Estonia and Latvia provide the fathers with 10 days of paternity leave with 100% wage replacement rate payments, fathers in Lithuania receive 28 days of the leave with full payment, while Poland has increased paternity leave for the fathers from one to two weeks in 2012 (with 100% replacement rate, no ceiling). Interestingly, Poland extended the duration of the basic maternity leave to 20 weeks, which together brings the Polish system in line with the suggestions included in the proposal for a revised Directive. A coalition with other countries already providing paternity leave and further discussion of the issue of father's rights and the obligations should be again brought back to the agenda.

¹² For statistics on the increase of non-standard contracts see Annex Figure 1.

Threats come from outside the parental leave system, such as for example the still persisting impact of the economic crisis with budgetary cuts that lead to shrinking social rights for men and women in several European countries. Apart from the economic conditions for reforming social policy systems, the political climate might not facilitate pro-gender equality reforms at the EU level.

2.2. Parental leave and father's entitlements

2.2.1. Existing framework and legislative plans

The EU-level legislation with regard to parental leave has been in force since 1996, when the first parental leave Directive was adopted on the basis of the 1995 Framework Agreement on Parental Leave¹³ (so called Parental Leave Directive). The Directive guaranteed entitlements for both: men and women to at least three months parental leave for children under 8 years of age, as well as protection from dismissal on the grounds of taking a break from employment for family reasons.

However, on the basis of the **new social partners' framework agreement**, the Directive was amended in 2010, introducing important changes strengthening the principle of gender equality in work and family life.¹⁴ The new framework agreed by the social partners was a part of a wider work on reconciliation and a series of actions that the social partners undertook on work-life balance (Clauwaert and Sechi 2011).

The new Directive introduced new references that included the mentioning of the former Lisbon Strategy and Barcelona target and the Framework of Actions on Gender Equality. Updated recitals adhere strongly to family policies to realise the principle of gender equality. Additionally, the new Directive recognises that "encouraging" fathers to participate in the leave is not sufficient and that, therefore, there is a need to urge the Member States to **"use more effective measures"**¹⁵. The amended Directive calls for recognising the "growing diversity of the labour force and societal developments including the increasing diversity of family structures"¹⁶.

In this sense, the main changes included **extending the obligatory duration** of the leave to four months and an obligation on the side of the Member States to reserve at least one month of the leave to fathers (second parents). Although the Directive recognizes the importance of **income replacement** during parental leave, especially with regard to the leave take-up by men, details in this respect are left for the Member States to decide. Additionally, the Directive's provisions were extended to cover **different employment contracts** as the basis for entitlement to parental leave (part-time, fixed term and temporary workers). Protection against any discriminatory treatment or dismissal was strengthened to focus on the Member States' role in securing sufficient measures. The employees may ask for **flexible working hours**.

¹³ Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICEF, CEEP and the ETUC.

¹⁴ Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC

¹⁵ Ibid., Recital 8.

¹⁶ Ibid., Recital 11.

2.2.2. Evaluation and analysis

An unquestionable **strength** of the new Directive is that it is **increasing the minimal standards** that are legally binding for all of the Member States. Even now, a variety of policy mixtures are offered by the national systems of childcare and family support based on various national cultures and historical backgrounds while all Member States are facing similar challenges, i.e. conflict between work and life for families with different backgrounds, as well as, on a macro scale, the challenge of a shrinking tax base. On the one hand, gender equality policies, as part of the family support package, have so far turned out to be most effective for increasing female employment and fertility rates. In sum, the new instruments (would) serve as the basis for the improvement of support for parenthood, as well as the enhancement of principles of gender equality in social and economic life.

However, the **weakness** of this solution is that these minimal provisions are **insufficient** for an effective change in gender relations in work and family life. Therefore, one month of the non-transferable leave without payment guaranteed should be regarded as a low common denominator. While the new emphasis on a more effective measure should be regarded as a step forward, the Directive leaves parental leave benefit to the Member States' interpretation and national regulations. Thus, even if the non-transferable and individual entitlement is in place, the take-up rates might still be disappointing. The evidence for take-up from various countries shows that only earmarking a special portion of the leave with an adequate payment for the fathers ("use it or lose it" principle) is an effective measure for mobilising fathers to decide to take part of the leave (Gupta, Smith, and Verner 2006; Bonnesen and Nielsen 2013).

Most of the Member States needed to **reform** their parental leave systems in order to comply with the new parental leave Directive. Some of the EU Member States' family support systems already included earmarked periods of parental leave even before the new framework was debated, with the most obvious example being **Sweden**. The **Finnish** system, until 2012, offered a bonus system for fathers that used an additional 24 days of the leave after using the first 18 days. Now the leave has been changed to 9 weeks only for the father. **Denmark** stands out as the only Nordic country that does not provide non-transferable parental leave beyond the two weeks of paternity leave.

The ECE countries are divided with regard to how they comply with the revised Directive. The **Czech Republic** is a country that clearly does not comply with the Directive alongside Slovakia – neither do these countries have any individual and non-transferable entitlements to parental leave, nor do they provide paternity leave that would be available for the fathers immediately after childbirth. **Poland** reserved one of 37 months of childcare leave for the father (literally: one parent) in 2013, in order to comply with the Directive, however, childcare leave is paid but at a very low rate (approx. 100 euro per month) and only for those who meet the income criteria. Therefore, earmarking one, practically unpaid, month for the fathers from the childcare leave does not seem to be an effective strategy.

Croatia has a very generously paid maternity leave: the mother is entitled to 410 days of leave with payment at the level of 90% of her salary, while the father is only entitled to the leave if transferred to him by the mother. In addition, Croatia has reformed its system of parental leave in line with the Parental Leave Directive, and thus, the duration of the parental leave was extended to eight months altogether, while two months became an individual and non-transferable right for the father. However, the allowance during the parental leave is flat-rate and diminishes with time, so this does not seem to be a sufficient

incentive for the fathers to take the leave (Dobrotić 2013). **Slovenia** has the most progressive solution among the post-communist countries, i.e. almost **three month of paternity leave**, within which 15 days are fully paid (with ceiling), and during the rest of the leave the benefit comes only as a flat-rate payment. Nevertheless, Slovenia is on the way to further improving the system. Currently, from the year after which “the economy improves”, the father will receive payment during the first 30 days of the parental leave at the level of 100% of his previous income, up to a ceiling of 2.5 times the average wage in Slovenia and the same will apply to the maternity leave benefit.

There are a number of countries, for example Ireland, that allocate some non-transferable portion of the leave to the father, although this goes **without any payment**, which considerably weakens the incentivising effect of such solutions. Similarly, **Cyprus** extended the unpaid duration of the parental leave from 13 to 18 weeks in 2012 to comply with the Directive.

Some Member States offer leave which seems in line with the requirements of the Directive, although it is difficult to classify it without doubt as parental leave or rather paternity leave. As such, **Lithuania** adopted the “Nordic” solution and introduced 4 weeks of paternity leave with full wage replacement, which represents a good incentive altogether to use this kind of entitlement by the fathers. One month of non-transferable parental leave was introduced in **Romania**, where one month also comes with the flat-rate payment. The leave might be taken within one year of the child’s life or spread over two years and could then be taken up with a lower payment. The abovementioned paternity leave for the fathers in **Portugal** is formally a part of parental leave and its formal label is “initial parental leave” as its first part comes immediately after the maternity leave.

Table 2 sums up the provision of paternity and parental leaves among the EU Member States. Observing the dynamics of the take-up of leaves available to fathers gives clear hints on how to effectively mobilise men to use parts of the leave. **Fathers’ take-up** of these schemes is remarkably higher in the countries that reserve part of the leave for the other partner, providing non-transferable, individual entitlements, with generous payments.¹⁷ In **Belgium**, between 2002 and 2012 the percentage of fathers on parental leave increased from 8.3 to 25.7 %, mostly in relation to individualised entitlements. The reform of parental leave in **Germany** that reserved two months for one parent in 2007 contributed to an increase of men using the leave from 3.3 % in 2006 to 29.3 % for children born in the second quarter of 2012 (Blum and Erler 2014). For **Portugal**, the increase was also due to the introduction of the obligatory part in 2009 (although excluding “special schemes”) from 37% in 2008 to 68% for the compulsory days in 2013 (Wall and Leitão 2004). Although outside of the EU, it is worth noting that flexibility and earmarking longer periods of the leave only for fathers leads to the increase in the use of the “father-only” quota in **Norway**: while only 0.6% of the fathers took exactly 12 weeks of the leave in 2011 (10 weeks was reserved for them), in 2012, after extending the earmarked period to 12 weeks, the percentage of fathers who decided to take 12 weeks of the leave increased to 21% (Brandth and Kvande 2014). At the same time, almost no fathers were using the entitlements in **Greece**, since the leave is unpaid. In **Slovakia**, there is no statutory leave for fathers, and no earmarked portions of parental leave for fathers only, thus, only 1% of the fathers reportedly take any part of the parental leave at all (also see Annex Table 3). The lack of obligation for the Members States to provide wage replacement

¹⁷ There are discussions on the level of the benefit that would be effective, but the researchers agree that the benefit should provide a reasonable level of income replacement, for example at least 2/3 of the previous earnings.


that would effectively encourage fathers to take the leave is a serious **weakness** in the current EU regulations on parental leave.

Nevertheless, there are **opportunities** to extend the father-only leave entitlements that are coming from the side of societal changes. Although there are national cultural differences in the perception of **gender roles** within society and the family and the propensity to take parental leave by the fathers might depend on a general level of acceptance for the fathers on leave and active fatherhood, men seem to realise their own needs towards the children and their rights as the fathers (Hobson 2002). The means of promoting the new roles for men in the form of **awareness raising campaigns** should remain an important instrument as a part of the actions aimed at closing the gender gap in caring time and domestic unpaid work. However, as pointed out by the research on parental leave use by men, awareness campaigns alone, when not accompanied by individual and non-transferable entitlements for men, are not sufficient to reach more gender equality with regard to family life, so they only rarely bring about any noticeable changes in men's behaviour.

Moreover, the existing research on the effects of the father's involvement represents an opportunity for the advocacy for the strengthening of the father's entitlements. Paid parental leave months in general contribute to the **child's well-being**, i.e. causing smaller infant mortality rates (Tanaka 2005). Furthermore, some studies suggest that the fathers' involvement in childcare is believed to contribute to the **women's choices** about having children (Duvander and Andersson 2006; Olah 2003). A study comparing **Hungarian** and **Swedish** families concluded that the more equal the division of domestic activities within the family, the bigger the probability of having the second child, and interestingly, the positive relation held for both Hungary and for Sweden, in spite of possessing very different cultural contexts.

There is a **threat**, though, that men's behaviour would not automatically change with the changes in policies and that father's staying at home during the leave would not engage enough in childcare and other domestic duties, as the statistics show that even in the countries with a higher take-up of parental leave by the fathers (see Figure 2), women still do the lion's share of the domestic unpaid work.

Figure 11: Gender gap with regard to time devoted to domestic activities



Source: Harmonised European Time Use Survey, the author's own calculations (number of hours daily devoted to domestic activities by men as subtracted from the number of hours daily devoted to domestic activities by women), also Szelewa 2013.

However, while it is important to have the argument in mind, it should be noted that some research results actually show that policies have some influence on the **shift in men's behaviour**. Therefore, Linda Hook's research demonstrated that men tend to engage more in domestic work in the policy context that supports female employment (childcare services) and the father's engagement in care (father's quota) (Hook 2006). The positive result between the women-friendly policy context and men's engagement in domestic duties disappears, where the **duration of parental leave** taken by the mothers exceeds two years. Therefore, long parental leave negatively influences women's professional careers but also leads to suppressing men's domestic work (Orloff 2009). Finally, a long maternity leave tends to coexist with gaps in employment of mothers and non-mothers (see Annex for reviewing the data). Consequently, it has to be concluded that only a gender balance in the share of the parental leave can provide a long-term support for gender equality in family and society.

3. FLEXIBLE WORKING TIME ARRANGEMENTS

KEY FINDINGS

- Flexible working time arrangements not only help to retain and further develop the parents' skills but also to participate in the community and public life.
- Mostly women use this kind of arrangements. Flexible working arrangements and part-time work might be associated with lower pay for women. This might further result in limited social rights and smaller benefits, including pensions.

The possibility to adjust working time to family needs was guaranteed by the Parental Leave Directive, which states that "flexible time arrangements make it easier for parents to combine work and parental responsibilities and facilitates the reintegration into work, especially after returning from parental leave".¹⁸ Thus, the main **strength** of these provisions is that they are useful for a smooth transition between the period when the parents stayed on leave and the moment when they return to work. Another important value of flexible working time is that it helps to retain and further develop the parents' skills but also to participate in the community and public life (ACEOWM 2010). Finally, when flexible working time is combined with both parents partially on parental leave, this might produce a gender balance in families.

A previous strategy for equality between men and women included an explicit reference to flexible working time arrangements suggesting that "flexible working arrangements boost productivity, enhance employee satisfaction and the employers' reputation" but also noticed that because these are mostly women who use the flexible working time solutions due to family reasons that might demonstrate persisting gender inequalities at the workplace and within the family (EC 2006). It seems, indeed, that one of the most serious **weaknesses** of this solution is that mostly women tend to use this kind of arrangements. Studies show that the flexible working arrangements and part-time work might be associated with lower pay for women (ACEOWM 2010). This might result in the limited social rights and smaller benefits, including pensions.

¹⁸ Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC.

Flexible working time guarantees were also proposed within the package revising the EU Working Time Directive.¹⁹ Although the agreement on revising the Directive has not been reached so far, the process of negotiations should be treated as an **opportunity** and therefore, should be observed carefully in order to monitor issues related to flexible working conditions and gender balance. The possible negative impact of flexible working time regulations would be strongly limited by an effective take-up of time-off from work by fathers – and combining this with their parental leave entitlements. Hence, an effective implementation of the parental leave Directive and the strengthening of entitlements for the fathers could provide the adequate instruments for using flexible working time regulations that would work for both men and women.

Threats for the effective and gender-balanced use of flexible working-time arrangements might be related to the persisting effects of the economic crisis – the employers might be unwilling to agree to any special work arrangements if they are not in line with the specific organization of the workplace.

4. AGEING, DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND THE NEW CARING NEEDS OF THE FAMILIES

KEY FINDINGS

- Population ageing is expected to increase in the future, especially in East-Central European countries. The process poses a challenge for the national welfare states and requires redefinition of the existing intergenerational and gender contract. A renewed emphasis on long-term care is necessary, as many of the Member States do not provide effective policy measures to assure high-standard long-term care institutions.
- The EU has a stronger focus on child services. Still, with respect to the Barcelona target of 33% of under 3-year old children, there were ten countries that reached the objective, while in the case of the older age group there were eight. There is a need to reaffirm and strengthen Barcelona targets as standard-setting tool at the EU level.

4.1. Ageing population and long-term care (LTC)

The **pressure on the national budgets** comes from many sources, including the forecasts of the shrinking employment base due to the processes of the European societies ageing. A total decline for the European countries took place between the 1960's and the 1980's, when the average total fertility rate (TRF) for women in the reproductive age decreased from 2.88 to 1.87 (see Annex Figure 2). With regard to some of the Western European countries, rebounding fertility rates could be observed in the mid-1990's.

¹⁹ Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time

However, the reversal of the negative trend did neither take place in Southern Europe, nor in the ECE countries.²⁰

The process of **ageing societies** is also caused by the growth in life expectancy. In 2010, the EU average life expectancy at 65 for men was a further 17.2 years and for women 20.7 years. The projected values for 2060 are 22.4 for men (an increase of 5.2 years) and 25.9 for women (an increase of 4.9 years) (EC 2012a). Moreover, within the next fifty years, the share of individuals aged 80+ in the overall population will increase by more than 2.5 times, which creates a **challenge** with regard to long-term care provision (Szelewa 2013).

While these challenges have been noted by the EU and its Member States and were at least partially tackled by the reforms of social policy, the scale of challenges requires a **redefinition of the existing intergenerational contract, as well as - the gender contract** (Esping-Andersen 2002). It also means new care needs for families – in addition to childcare. Especially senior female workers have been found in a trap between still being professionally active, caring for their elderly parents and taking care of their grandchildren, thus representing the so-called “**sandwich generation**” (Ben-Galim and Silim 2013; Saraceno 2013, 2010).

The process of ageing, consequences of the negative demographic processes, a shrinking tax base, and threats for the sustainability of public finances over the long term has received attention at the EU level. While the reference to gender balance in childcare and investment in childcare services have been a part of several EU strategic documents, there are not so many EU-level instruments that would directly address the issue of long-term care. The **Social Protection Committee** (SPC) and in particular its **Working Group on Age**, is dealing with long-term care, monitoring frequently the development of long-term care services in Member States; regular references to long-term care are present in the yearly working programmes (SPC 2014). With regard to gender issues, the working group has paid attention to the issue of the **overrepresentation of women in the provision of both formal and informal care provision** as a sign of gender stereotypes with regard to caring activities (CEU 2014). Furthermore, the framework for action has been included in the **European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing** that is aimed at “increasing the average healthy lifespan of Europeans by 2 years by 2020” (EC 2012b). The strategy is, thus, more focused on the issues of public health, and includes the business sector in building the infrastructure and organization for active and healthy ageing bringing together various stakeholders.

The innovative and wide approach to the issues of ageing and long-term care should be regarded as a **strength** of the EU recommendations and strategies. However, the actions dealing with the issues of ageing seem to be more a part of the soft measures of the EU influence and have therefore only a **limited impact** on the Member States real reforms within the field of LTC. In addition, the EU sets no targets here such as in the case of the Barcelona objectives for childcare services, while there are a variety of solutions within the EU. Although the problem of ageing touches all the EU countries, the existing policy frameworks deal with the issues differently. While, for example, the Northern European countries often include institutionalised care with several options for mixed care models, Southern Europe and several ECE countries often lack institutionalised, affordable LTC of

²⁰ In ECE countries, the transition from state-socialism to a market economy and a democratic political system was accompanied by a rapid change in demographic trends: while the ECE countries had relatively high TFRs at the end of the 1980's, through the 1990's and 2000's the TFR fell dramatically.

high quality, leaving families primarily responsible for the provision of care, and within the family the burden is placed on women (Saraceno 2013).

This situation leads to families hiring **migrant workers**, very often female, who work without a formal contract in LTC. These care migrant workers find themselves without any adequate protection as they do not qualify for social rights and entitlements. Thus, it is necessary to consider gender imbalances with regard to care work provided in the informal sector, with the inclusion of migrants, as well as the chain of migration within the EU (female workers migrating from Eastern Europe to Western and Southern European countries) (Lutz and Palenga-Mollenbeck 2012). Thus, there is a **potential to expand** the existing EU framework, especially with relation to gender issues in care.

Further opportunities should be connected with **partnerships** between the business sector and the public organization of care, where the innovative elements with regard to the provision of health and long term care could improve gender balance among the care workers, for example by introducing more advanced technological solutions and services that increase the quality of life in later age. Depending on political choices, the most important **threats** could be connected to structural factors and economic conditions for investing in new, innovative strategies that would contribute to the elimination of gender imbalances within care work. Here, again, the long-term consequences of the austerity measures related to the economic crisis could hamper any efforts to introduce more equity in the system of care in ageing societies.

4.2. Childcare services and Barcelona objectives

Realising a **fundamental and multifaceted role of childcare infrastructure** for female employment prospects, in 2002, as a result of the Spanish presidency, the European Council introduced the Barcelona targets. The established targets stated that by 2010, the Member States should reach the stipulated enrolment rate of children. Accordingly, it was proposed that 33% between the ages of 0-3 and 90% of children between 3 and the mandatory school age, should be enrolled in formal childcare. By 2010 only eight countries reached both of these targets. **With respect to the target of 33% of under 3-year old children, there were ten countries that reached the objective, while in the case of the older age group there were eight.** Annex Figures 3 and 4 display the situation for 2010 in both age groups.²¹

The **strengths** of the Barcelona targets and related monitoring can be found in several areas. Firstly, the presence of targets and the monitoring of progress towards them, increased the awareness of policy-makers and key stakeholders concerning the importance of childcare facilities for individuals and female employment but also helped social inclusion from a very young age. It serves as an important argument for the development of childcare, regardless of the cultural traditions present in a given society. Finally, the formulation of the Barcelona targets in terms of the enrolment in formal childcare, rather than, spending on childcare, for example, allows for easier monitoring by social partners and thus, increases the government's accountability.

²¹ When it comes to the younger age group, apart from the outstanding position of Denmark, in the countries which achieved the target, the enrolment rate does not exceed it by more than 10-15 percentage points. At the same time, in some countries with low enrolment rates, the gap to bridge the target is larger than 20 percentage points. This means that the catch-up process will require a significant period of time, as well as considerable resources to finance it. The analysis of the older age group suggests that in the countries which did not achieve the target, the gap is significantly smaller, given the position achieved so far.

Simultaneously, some **weaknesses** of the targets have been pointed out. The way the targets were formulated, masks the quality aspect of care. The issue of **childcare quality** is not only essential in terms of children's development and the equalising of chances but also as an important incentive for parents to use childcare facilities. Also, the general formulation of aspects does not say much about the **affordability** of care services. In some countries, childcare might be available only to highly paid individuals. As a result, the use of childcare (and the employment of parents) may be strongly stratified. Finally, the issue of the demand for childcare is not included in the targets. Even though it might be argued that the alternative strategies of childcare are embedded in the cultural context of a given society, the empirical research demonstrates that such strategies are often used because of the lack of formal childcare.

One may also find significant **opportunities** when it comes to the Barcelona targets. The empirical research demonstrates that the increasing presence of the childcare institutions impacts the societal attitudes. This occurs through the process of social and political learning that childcare institutions are more accepted as a form of care, when their benefits are socially visible. Moreover, the success of some countries in the progress towards the Barcelona targets suggests a similar strategy can be used in other fields of social protection/social services. The most relevant case would be long-term care. Additional political impetus comes from the **Social Investment Package (SIP)**, a recent initiative by the European Commission. The SIP provides a modern framework for the development of childcare which takes into account the interests of both parents and children as well as social partners, in particular, employers.

When taking into consideration the **threats** related to the Barcelona targets, one should mention the financing of childcare services. Given the fiscal constraint, the issue of social investment is perceived as of secondary importance to policy makers, who do not perceive its benefits in the long run. The use of structural funds may face the risk of short-term project financing, which may not be sustained from other sources. Further, special attention should be paid to the trade-off between the further extension of leave (and associated benefits) and the extension of the coverage in the field of childcare. However, this should not mean that childcare should be extended at the cost of other social benefits/services. Finally, progress on the quality, and not only the quantity of childcare services will increase not only the parental support for the extension of childcare, but also prove essential for building the human capital of future generations.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the EU has for a long time been perceived as a **pioneer** in setting the agenda for gender equality, especially with regard to work and life balance, the analysis of the EU legislation and within the field of parental leave allows for the drawing of **less optimistic conclusions**, mainly due to the persisting gender gaps in employment and pay. At the same time, women still do the bulk of the unpaid work, while the majority of the care workers, whether formal or informal, are also female.

The **implications of the economic crisis** might endanger the process of enhancement of the politics of work-life balance. On the one hand, the crisis contributed to employment (and income) instability, on the other, many countries needed to introduce cuts in spending on social policies, including investments in care services or in paid parental leaves.

However, with the institutional and political role that the EU plays with regard to gender equality issues, there is a need and potential to increase and intensify the engagement in gender equality policies within the field of work-life balance. Therefore, the following recommendations are made as to the issues analysed above and to be possibly taken into account when formulating goals and actions within the **new Strategy for Equality between Women and Men**. The recommendations are both **substantial** (*what* kind of solutions are recommended) and **strategic** (*how* to advocate for the solution).

Recommendations with regard to the employment policies as related to work-life balance

The gender disparities remain stark. Women care more for children and other dependants, but also face more unstable labour markets.

The **European Commission**, should

- provide for initiatives for more evenly distributed care activities between men and women in a revised EU2020 Strategy and in the new strategy for equality between men and women. These measures should target in particular the participation of men, accompanied by a network of affordable childcare facilities.
- continue to provide Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) under the European Semester with regard to improved childcare services.
- provide for (legislative) guidelines to Member States regarding the involvement of fathers in un-paid care work.

Recommendations with regard to maternity leave and paternity leave:

As absence from work for reasons of maternity and paternity have a comprehensive impact on the financial situation of families on the one hand and the situation of men and women on the other hand, the EU legislation with regard to maternity leave duration and payment are no longer sufficient to create a level playing field within the EU, especially with regard to the fact that nowadays many countries go beyond the minimum requirements of 14 weeks. Following the recommendation of the ILO, maternity leave should be **extended to 18 or even 20 weeks**, with the guarantee of **full pay** and full application to **new forms of families** as well as **all types of employment contracts**. Mothers need to have an opportunity for the **flexible use of leave**.

- The European legislator should therefore proceed with the adoption of the revision of the so called **Maternity Leave Directive**.

The birth of a child requires from families a new organization of time. Caring for an infant is a demanding task that should be shared by both parents from the first days, when the child arrives at home. Thus, a more gender balanced division of work requires days-off from work for the father as well, especially, given that there is now a variety of solutions applied by the Member States.

- The EU legislator should seek for ways on how to oblige Member States to introduce **two weeks of paternity leave**, with adequate wage replacement, either by adopting the proposals of the EP in the first reading of the proposal for a revised Maternity Leave Directive or based on a new legislative initiative of the Commission.

- The Commission should take the need for paternity leave into account when drafting the new employment guidelines and in their CSR in the framework of the European Semester.

Countries that have already both longer maternity leave and paid paternity leave should be interested in establishing the common standard at the EU level which might pave the way for possible coalitions in favour of the new solutions.

Recommendations with regard to parental leave

Earmarked periods for the fathers diminish one of the biggest obstacles for female autonomy, i.e. the necessity to perform the **unpaid domestic work**. The existing Parental Leave Directive could be further developed: **one month reserved for the father should come with adequate pay** as unpaid leave proved insufficient to effectively encourage the fathers to use their part of parental leave. Ideally, a longer period of the leave should be reserved, for example one third.

The arguments in favour of strengthening the father's entitlements with regard to the parental leave system are justified first of all by a **more gender balanced division of work within the family**. Furthermore, advocating for "father's only" parts of the leave could point to the **positive impact of the fathers' engagement in domestic duties on decisions about having more children**. Fathers on parental leave engage more in care and household duties and facilitate women's professional careers and economic independence.

- The European Commission should ensure the full implementation of the current Parental Leave Directive in all Member States which is presently not the case.
- The European Parliament should ensure a stricter monitoring of the Directive's transposition for a transparent overview of the situation.

Recommendations with regard to flexible working time

Although there are clear advantages of the flexible working time arrangements, the EU should monitor gender balance in using such regulations in the Member States. For example, flexible working time conditions should be combined with the options for a flexible use of parental leave by both parents.

- The European Commission should include corresponding provisions in their proposal for the new Employment Guidelines and in the CSRs under the European Semester.
- All European institutions should monitor, regularly evaluate and, where necessary, seek to adjust the implementation of the flexicurity principle.

Recommendations with regard to the policy towards ageing

Unlike in the case of childcare services, the EU did not set the standards with regard to the long-term care of elderly persons in need that would be as clear as the Barcelona targets for childcare. At the same time, there is a considerable variety of solutions within the Member States. Thus, **a similar set of objectives could be developed for long-term**

care, with the emphasis on care quality, affordability and innovative solutions that would meet the variety of needs of ageing men and women and would take into account that most of the care workers are women, including migrant women working without any specific contracts.

The European Commission should

- monitor both the formal and informal provision of long-term care, including the share of unpaid care work.
- include respective CSR under the European Semester Process.

The Council should adopt targets for the establishment of long-term care institutions following the example of the Barcelona Targets.

Recommendations with regard to the Barcelona targets

- The European Commission should carry out a comprehensive assessment whether further expansion of leaves would have the desired effects given the different labour market constraints of men and women and the effects on the availability of child care facilities. Again, the European Semester might serve as a platform for a more thorough assessment of meeting the Barcelona targets.
- The Council should renew its commitment to the Barcelona Targets.

In general, it is also recommended that references to the abovementioned issues and proposals should be present in the **EP-hearings of the new Commissioners**, as well as in the forthcoming **EP Report**.

In conclusion, there is a **potential for action** with the use of the existing EU mechanisms, however, there are also some threats connected with the strategies advocating for more gender equality in the present work-life balance policy package promoted by the EU. Some researchers point to the need to reemphasise the objective of gender equality in strategies, documents and frameworks for action alongside employment and human capital development (Stratigaki 2004; Jenson 2008). **More balance** is required between the strategic economization of gender equality issues and gender equality as an objective in itself as laid down in Articles 2 and 3 TEU.

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ANNEX

Annex Table 1: Employment rates of men and women with and without children < 12

<i>Country</i>	<i>Women Without children</i>	<i>Women With children</i>	<i>GAP</i>	<i>Men Without children</i>	<i>Men With children</i>	<i>GAP</i>
Austria	85,5	72,8	-12,7	87,6	92,7	5,1
Belgium	78,5	72,4	-6,1	83,0	91,4	8,4
Bulgaria	77,5	64,8	-12,7	76,7	83,0	6,3
Cyprus	81,7	73,1	-8,6	85,2	93,9	8,7
Czech Republic	86,0	54,4	-31,6	88,6	95,5	6,9
Estonia	81,9	62,6	-19,3	73,5	82,4	8,9
Finland	84,1	71,4	-12,7	80,6	92,4	11,8
France	81,3	72,3	-9,0	83,7	91,7	8,0
Germany	83,8	64,5	-19,3	85,0	91,7	6,7
Greece	66,1	58,2	-7,9	82,1	93,0	10,9
Hungary	78,2	49,3	-28,9	77,1	84,5	7,4
Ireland	76,0	57,2	-18,8	71,2	80,0	8,8
Italy	62,7	54,7	-8,0	78,7	90,8	12,1
Latvia	77,9	69,6	-8,3	69,6	81,0	11,4
Lithuania	78,2	74,9	-3,3	67,1	80,2	13,1
Luxembourg	78,8	69,4	-9,4	90,6	95,6	5,0
Malta	59,4	42,6	-16,8	86,4	94,9	8,5
Netherlands	82,8	78,2	-4,6	88,2	94,1	5,9
Poland	78,6	66,8	-11,8	79,5	91,8	12,3
Portugal	76,5	74,6	-1,9	79,8	91,2	11,4
Romania	70,8	66,3	-4,5	80,0	86,5	6,5
Slovakia	80,4	53,7	-26,7	78,4	89,4	11,0
Slovenia	83,0	84,9	1,9	81,9	94,1	12,2
Spain	68,1	60,1	-8,0	71,9	81,5	9,6
United Kingdom	81,9	65,6	-16,3	83,0	90,5	7,5

Source: EC 2012c, Table 10. For 2010, and without Denmark and Sweden.

Annex Table 2: Basic paternity leave and/or special incentives to take the parental leave in Member States 2014.

Country	Paternity leave	Entitlement: individual and non-transferable or family-based, Whether there are any incentives for fathers.
Austria	No statutory leave , one month of unpaid leave for public sector workers. Some private sectors grant 2 days to fathers.	No fathers' quota , bonus payment months if both parents apply.
Belgium	10 working days , 3 days obligatory; Payment : full pay for 3 days, then 82%, with a ceiling.	4 months non-transferable with a low flat-rate payment.
Bulgaria	15 days ; Payment : 90% salary replacement rate	None.
Croatia	None.	2 months non-transferable. Payment : 80% of the budgetary base rate.
Cyprus	18 weeks of unpaid leave, among which 2 weeks can be transferred.	
Czech Republic	None.	Family. No incentives.
Denmark	14 days ; Payment : based on the previous earnings.	Family. No incentives.
Estonia	10 working days ; Payment : 100% wage replacement	Family. No incentives.
Finland	9 weeks ; Payment : 75% (30 days) and 70% (further) replacement wage	Family. No incentives.
France	11 working days (two weeks) Payment : 100% up to a ceiling	6 months non-transferable parental leave (from July 2014) with a flat-rate payment
Germany	None.	2 months non-transferable parental leave – as a “bonus”, Payment : 67% replacement of the wage, with a ceiling.
Greece	2 days paid leave paid by the employer.	4 months non-transferable leave , no payment. Public sector: up to 2 years per parent.
Hungary	5 days with 100% wage replacement.	1 year individually to mother Then – family entitlement.
Ireland	None.	4 weeks non-transferable, unpaid.
Italy	1 day of compulsory leave with 100% wage replacement.	6 months of non-transferable leave. Payment : 30% wage replacement. Incentives : additional months if father takes at least 3 months .
Latvia	10 days , leave with 80% wage replacement.	Family. No incentives.
Lithuania	28 days (4 weeks) with 100% wage replacement.	Family. No incentives.
Luxembourg	No statutory leave , but taking 2 days of “leave due to extraordinary circumstances” with full pay is possible.	6 months of non-transferable leave with a flat-rate payment (1775 euro/month).
Malta	1 working day of a special birth leave, with 100% replacement rate	4 months of non-transferable leave , unpaid
Netherlands	2 working days , with 100% wage replacement rate.	26 weeks (38 work hours per week) of non-transferable leave , unpaid (but tax cuts).
Poland	14 days , with 100% wage replacement rate.	Parental leave: family entitlement Childcare leave: 1 month non-transferable , unpaid.
Portugal	None, replaced by “initial father-only parental leave”	20 days of “initial father-only parental leave”, 10 days obligatory after the childbirth, with 100% replacement rate. 3 months of non-transferable leave with 25% replacement rate. 1 month bonus if parents share

Romania	a) 5 days , b) 15 days (5 plus 10) if a child-care certificate is obtained after a child-care course and c) 7 days for fathers enrolled in the military service; Payment: 25% (for 5 days) and 75% (for 15 days).*	'initial' leave. 1 month of non-transferable leave, payment with a ceiling.
Slovakia	None.	Family (only one person can take the leave). No incentives.
Slovenia	90 days leave. Payment: the first 15 days are paid 90% wage replacement rate with a ceiling (100% in the case of low income). The remaining 75 days: flat-rate payment	30 days of the leave as individual non-transferable entitlement (from September 2014). Payment: 90% wage replacement rate with a ceiling (100% in case of low income).
Spain	15 calendar days: 2 days of Birth leave plus 13 days of paternity leave; Payment: 100% wage replacement rate.	Individual, but transferable. Unpaid. No incentives.
Sweden	10 days at birth. Payment: 80% wage replacement rate.	60 days of a total of 480 days are reserved for one parent. The parents also get a gender equality bonus if they share the parental leave days equally.
UK	Two weeks. Payment: flat-rate unless low income, then 90% replacement rate.	18 weeks individual non-transferable entitlement, unpaid.

Source: The author's own compilation on the basis of Moss 2014, MISSOC database (the 'Mutual Information System on Social Protection'), as well as European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS). *Information on the basis of Scambor, Wojnicka, and Bergmann 2012.

Annex Table 3: Take-up of paternity and/or parental leave by men in selected Member States.

Country	Take-up of paternity and/or parental leave by men in several of the Member States
Belgium	68% of the fathers use paternity leave, and 25.7 % - parental leave;
Denmark	60% of fathers of children born in 2011 took paternity leave, while 7.2% of the parental leave was taken by men (25% of men took some parental leave, most of them being public employees);
Estonia	38% of the fathers took paternity leave in 2013;
Finland	84% of fathers used paternity leave in 2012;
France	60% of eligible fathers used the paternity leave in 2012;
Germany	29.3 % of fathers of the children born in the second quarter of 2012 used 'father-only' parental leave;
Luxembourg	a growing number of fathers use their entitlement to parental leave: the number increased from 6.3 % in 1999 to 23.4 % in 2012;
the Netherlands	23% of the fathers used parental leave in 2013;
Portugal	68% of the fathers used the compulsory days of paternity leave in 2013.

Source: Moss 2014, country notes.

Annex Table 4: Employment rate of women 20-24 years old in European countries, 2000-2013.

GEO/TIME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	65,1	63,0	63,9	63,0	63,9	66,5	66,5	66,7	67,3	67,7	65,7	66,4	65,8	66,8
Belgium	46,8	44,1	44,2	41,1	45,4	44,5	44,3	44,6	44,7	40,5	40,6	40,6	38,7	37,5
Bulgaria	28,7	35,3	34,5	36,1	37,6	36,3	39,6	41,3	43,3	39,9	35,5	31,9	29,7	30,0
Croatia	na	na	37,5	34,5	36,3	35,2	36,4	36,4	34,7	34,0	30,7	26,7	22,9	20,4
Cyprus	61,7	64,3	64,1	64,7	61,8	59,1	61,1	60,8	62,7	61,4	58,8	50,9	46,4	41,1
Czech Republic	53,1	52,4	50,1	47,5	45,3	41,0	42,1	42,8	41,0	37,4	35,6	33,8	35,3	34,9
Denmark	69,3	66,9	69,2	67,1	64,6	68,6	69,4	71,2	71,9	70,8	66,8	66,3	62,0	62,6
Estonia	43,4	37,8	39,0	36,6	44,4	48,0	45,9	49,4	55,7	44,9	39,5	45,9	47,4	47,4
European Union (28 countries)	na	na	48,7	48,5	48,2	48,3	49,2	50,1	50,4	48,3	46,9	45,9	45,1	44,7
Finland	58,7	59,0	58,5	60,3	58,8	57,1	57,4	60,4	62,2	58,9	57,8	59,3	59,4	60,3
France	44,3	44,4	44,8	47,4	45,8	45,6	44,6	47,4	47,7	47,3	45,4	44,4	43,8	43,4
Germany	63,0	63,0	62,0	61,1	57,2	57,5	59,2	60,8	62,1	61,8	61,9	63,4	62,3	62,9
Greece	37,4	35,5	35,7	33,8	36,0	32,5	31,9	32,3	32,5	32,2	28,3	23,8	18,7	17,6
Hungary	44,5	42,7	43,7	41,5	36,6	34,7	33,9	32,4	31,0	30,0	30,3	30,2	31,1	30,3
Ireland	64,2	63,0	62,0	62,2	62,1	65,5	66,4	67,2	64,7	59,0	52,7	49,8	49,0	49,4
Italy	33,6	33,8	33,4	33,4	36,3	34,7	34,0	33,0	33,1	29,6	29,1	27,4	26,1	24,4
Latvia	45,2	44,8	46,9	47,3	39,9	45,6	49,9	53,6	55,3	44,4	41,8	38,7	41,3	42,5
Lithuania	43,1	40,6	43,2	38,0	31,8	34,3	40,4	38,3	40,8	37,9	33,2	32,0	36,7	37,8
Luxembourg	47,3	48,1	47,0	46,3	36,6	39,6	38,9	32,9	39,0	39,9	35,2	32,6	35,1	31,7
Malta	73,0	71,3	71,0	64,8	64,6	65,0	67,4	68,4	68,5	64,3	64,2	63,3	60,7	66,9
Netherlands	76,0	77,5	79,2	78,6	77,0	76,2	76,4	77,7	77,6	77,8	72,9	73,8	73,6	71,9
Poland	37,4	37,7	33,8	31,8	30,7	32,9	35,4	37,9	40,3	39,6	37,9	34,5	34,0	33,3
Portugal	51,6	52,3	54,4	52,3	48,6	47,7	48,7	48,5	50,3	49,2	45,0	42,6	37,5	35,4
Romania	47,5	44,3	38,6	37,8	42,2	35,5	33,9	33,1	32,2	31,4	30,4	29,7	29,9	29,6
Slovakia	46,7	44,3	41,6	44,4	43,9	41,9	40,2	42,8	38,3	33,6	30,7	26,5	27,4	27,9
Slovenia	46,2	43,8	44,1	39,2	46,1	46,4	46,9	48,0	48,9	44,9	43,8	40,5	38,0	35,1
Spain	39,9	41,5	42,1	43,9	44,9	49,4	52,0	51,3	50,4	43,0	40,3	36,7	31,2	28,2
Sweden	53,1	62,2	60,6	60,1	56,4	57,1	57,7	60,8	59,8	55,8	56,0	58,0	57,4	58,1
United Kingdom	64,6	65,1	66,2	65,0	66,0	65,0	66,1	65,3	64,7	62,0	61,1	59,9	60,9	61,5

Source: Eurostat LFS

Annex Table 5: Employment rate of women 25-29 years old in European countries, 2000-2013.

GEO/TIME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	75,2	77,2	77,2	75,5	75,9	76,0	75,6	73,9	75,1	76,7	76,7	77,0	79,5	79,5
Belgium	77,7	72,0	73,2	71,9	74,5	74,8	74,4	74,9	75,7	75,5	74,1	73,0	72,2	71,5
Bulgaria	53,1	54,8	55,3	55,6	58,6	57,1	60,8	66,0	66,7	62,1	61,0	59,1	58,5	55,4
Croatia	na	na	61,2	62,4	59,2	64,1	66,9	69,4	68,3	66,2	65,1	60,0	58,4	59,8
Cyprus	74,3	74,9	81,2	77,7	77,9	74,6	78,3	79,3	80,9	78,4	78,8	79,3	73,1	71,5
Czech Republic	56,6	54,9	57,4	58,3	55,9	57,6	60,1	61,5	63,1	61,2	60,3	61,1	60,3	64,1
Denmark	74,6	75,2	74,7	70,9	76,3	74,4	75,8	77,0	79,8	77,7	72,3	69,1	68,3	68,1
Estonia	62,8	61,3	65,4	67,4	63,0	64,6	73,1	67,5	63,5	63,0	63,2	68,0	63,6	65,4
European Union (28 countries)	na	na	65,6	66,3	66,3	66,3	68,0	68,8	69,4	68,2	67,4	67,0	66,1	65,7
Finland	66,7	69,3	72,7	71,5	68,4	70,9	70,8	73,5	73,7	71,1	70,7	70,9	71,0	69,7
France	68,7	68,9	70,8	71,3	71,9	71,9	72,8	72,5	72,8	72,3	72,2	70,9	70,0	70,3
Germany	70,0	69,8	69,9	68,2	67,1	65,3	67,6	68,9	70,2	71,4	72,4	74,7	74,2	74,5
Greece	53,8	55,6	56,5	59,4	59,0	60,4	62,8	62,6	63,5	63,7	60,1	52,6	49,0	43,4
Hungary	55,5	57,5	58,3	59,2	58,9	59,8	60,7	61,2	61,3	59,7	59,0	58,8	59,8	61,1
Ireland	79,2	77,7	78,2	76,6	76,6	77,0	77,5	78,1	76,1	72,4	69,7	67,8	67,9	68,5
Italy	48,9	50,9	52,1	54,1	55,9	53,6	55,7	55,1	55,4	53,2	50,8	50,8	49,9	45,8
Latvia	62,0	67,4	67,4	68,4	67,0	66,5	70,1	69,2	72,6	65,0	66,6	67,4	70,1	71,6
Lithuania	76,0	70,2	71,3	78,0	71,8	75,2	76,0	74,1	74,8	75,8	72,9	73,4	74,4	74,3
Luxembourg	74,3	75,4	78,0	76,4	76,3	77,2	73,2	78,0	72,2	78,0	75,9	76,8	75,3	73,9
Malta	56,1	59,9	61,1	55,9	60,9	61,5	65,3	68,7	70,5	68,9	70,6	74,3	75,9	77,6
Netherlands	80,0	82,8	80,3	81,0	81,6	81,3	83,1	83,4	84,2	84,1	82,6	82,4	81,6	81,3
Poland	57,5	57,6	57,5	60,3	57,8	59,4	62,9	66,2	68,1	66,8	66,4	65,5	64,6	64,6
Portugal	78,2	77,1	77,7	77,1	76,0	74,2	73,1	72,3	73,9	75,1	72,2	72,5	70,3	66,7
Romania	69,3	69,0	65,1	66,8	65,7	63,8	65,2	66,0	65,5	63,5	62,2	63,6	62,8	62,0
Slovakia	56,8	57,2	57,7	60,3	59,3	55,4	59,8	58,6	61,4	58,7	59,6	58,0	57,2	58,0
Slovenia	81,0	77,9	78,0	75,8	76,9	77,2	72,3	75,3	78,8	73,6	73,1	72,4	68,4	65,3
Spain	60,0	61,0	62,8	65,2	67,4	70,0	71,3	73,0	72,3	67,2	65,2	62,8	59,6	57,5
Sweden	72,2	75,8	75,4	76,3	73,8	73,9	74,6	75,8	76,4	74,1	72,6	74,7	74,3	74,5
United Kingdom	71,9	72,3	72,5	72,4	72,3	72,7	72,9	72,6	73,0	72,2	71,6	70,7	69,6	71,6

Source : Eurostat LFS

Annex Table 6: Employment rate of women 30-34 years old in European countries, 2000-2013.

GEO/TIME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	76,9	75,8	76,7	77,9	77,4	73,7	74,3	74,5	77,6	78,8	78,0	78,4	80,2	78,5
Belgium	76,1	74,3	73,4	73,1	75,2	74,9	76,9	76,0	78,9	77,1	77,2	75,7	76,7	75,3
Bulgaria	66,5	66,3	66,1	66,4	68,8	68,4	70,3	73,6	75,4	71,7	67,4	66,6	67,2	67,1
Croatia	na	na	63,2	65,1	71,6	70,4	69,4	73,3	72,4	74,3	70,8	69,0	66,4	70,0
Cyprus	70,3	77,2	77,2	79,3	75,5	77,2	78,4	81,6	82,6	83,2	81,5	79,6	77,4	75,6
Czech Republic	64,8	66,5	65,9	64,6	64,9	65,5	63,6	62,4	60,9	59,3	58,3	59,9	58,4	59,9
Denmark	79,8	81,8	83,5	76,0	79,6	79,8	81,7	80,8	82,2	81,1	79,9	76,6	78,6	77,3
Estonia	72,7	59,1	70,9	67,4	67,0	72,5	75,2	78,5	76,7	67,9	67,7	65,9	67,2	67,2
European Union (28 countries)	na	na	68,2	68,3	69,3	69,0	70,0	71,0	71,7	70,5	69,9	70,1	69,9	69,8
Finland	71,3	72,9	75,1	75,3	75,7	74,2	74,5	74,9	75,5	75,8	72,8	72,0	70,7	70,3
France	67,9	69,4	69,2	72,6	70,3	71,8	70,6	73,5	76,2	73,8	73,8	73,3	73,7	74,5
Germany	70,6	71,3	71,3	71,2	69,8	66,6	70,0	71,0	70,5	72,2	72,6	74,9	75,6	76,0
Greece	57,5	57,8	58,7	59,7	61,7	61,9	63,7	62,6	63,9	64,7	61,7	57,9	56,0	53,1
Hungary	61,5	62,3	60,8	61,0	60,1	61,3	62,9	62,2	60,5	58,8	59,3	58,8	60,5	61,9
Ireland	68,6	68,6	70,7	68,1	69,3	71,8	71,8	71,8	72,1	70,1	70,0	69,0	68,8	69,2
Italy	54,8	56,2	58,3	57,8	63,0	62,0	62,0	62,2	63,0	61,0	59,2	59,3	59,3	57,3
Latvia	71,9	77,5	74,8	75,8	74,8	71,7	77,5	74,1	75,7	73,4	72,2	74,7	73,9	75,1
Lithuania	71,3	75,0	75,9	81,7	79,7	79,2	81,7	81,7	79,6	79,7	75,7	78,5	80,8	82,3
Luxembourg	70,5	71,8	73,7	68,8	70,7	73,1	80,7	80,2	75,9	79,2	77,9	79,9	81,5	80,2
Malta	40,9	36,6	37,9	41,1	39,6	43,1	48,7	50,8	54,5	57,5	59,0	64,5	65,1	65,3
Netherlands	76,0	76,7	78,4	78,5	76,7	78,6	79,8	81,5	83,9	83,7	83,0	82,2	81,9	79,8
Poland	62,0	62,8	64,2	63,5	67,3	66,4	68,5	72,1	72,6	72,5	71,5	70,4	70,6	70,1
Portugal	77,3	79,4	79,9	79,9	79,7	80,9	80,1	79,6	80,4	77,2	77,2	78,8	74,2	75,0
Romania	75,6	74,8	72,1	69,7	70,9	68,8	71,0	70,6	70,9	70,3	70,4	69,7	68,7	68,0
Slovakia	65,2	67,2	64,2	65,4	64,9	64,5	64,1	65,4	67,3	65,0	61,4	59,9	58,4	57,5
Slovenia	87,6	88,2	87,0	86,2	89,6	87,1	87,5	87,6	88,8	87,1	85,6	85,0	83,2	78,8
Spain	54,9	57,3	62,1	63,0	65,1	68,4	70,3	72,2	72,1	68,9	68,2	67,3	65,4	64,3
Sweden	79,0	80,1	82,1	79,6	79,0	78,3	81,1	82,8	83,5	81,3	80,2	81,5	80,6	79,8
United Kingdom	71,2	70,9	70,5	70,3	71,7	72,3	71,5	71,4	72,6	70,8	71,3	72,3	72,4	73,3

Source : Eurostat LFS

Annex Table 7: Employment rate of women 35-39 years old in European countries, 2000-2013

GEO/TIME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	76,8	76,8	79,0	79,2	76,5	78,1	78,6	79,9	80,5	81,1	80,9	81,7	81,8	81,3
Belgium	72,7	70,2	69,7	73,1	71,7	74,9	74,8	75,9	77,4	77,3	78,6	76,7	76,9	76,7
Bulgaria	71,6	73,3	72,6	73,8	74,5	75,6	77,5	78,3	80,2	79,0	76,4	75,6	75,6	76,2
Croatia	na	na	70,6	69,9	68,2	71,4	70,9	75,3	75,8	74,3	70,4	69,2	70,7	70,9
Cyprus	59,5	66,7	74,9	79,4	75,6	71,8	74,7	78,7	75,9	79,7	81,4	80,8	76,6	75,4
Czech Republic	78,9	78,9	80,2	79,1	78,6	78,2	77,6	76,5	75,4	74,1	74,7	75,3	74,9	73,9
Denmark	84,8	81,7	81,2	81,3	83,1	82,3	83,0	84,9	86,1	81,7	80,1	81,6	80,6	80,4
Estonia	72,8	76,5	71,6	76,7	77,0	77,4	81,6	77,7	78,9	78,3	75,0	74,7	76,2	74,3
European Union (28 countries)	na	na	69,4	70,4	70,4	70,8	71,8	72,9	73,5	72,9	72,3	72,3	72,2	72,2
Finland	79,4	80,0	81,0	78,6	75,0	78,7	78,6	79,0	81,1	81,1	78,9	80,0	78,7	75,8
France	70,6	71,6	72,3	74,5	73,9	73,8	75,0	76,5	78,2	78,1	77,8	76,7	77,1	77,3
Germany	72,1	72,7	72,1	72,5	71,5	71,3	72,7	74,3	74,6	74,7	74,9	76,2	76,6	76,9
Greece	57,8	57,5	60,7	60,4	62,4	62,9	63,7	65,0	65,0	65,0	65,1	61,8	56,8	55,4
Hungary	71,6	71,5	71,4	72,6	70,0	69,5	69,1	69,0	69,2	68,3	67,1	65,8	67,3	68,2
Ireland	62,1	63,6	62,8	64,7	63,1	64,3	64,8	67,1	68,0	64,7	63,0	64,5	64,6	67,8
Italy	56,5	57,0	58,4	59,5	61,4	61,6	62,9	63,0	63,3	62,4	62,1	62,6	62,1	62,2
Latvia	76,3	76,9	76,9	78,4	77,3	77,4	81,6	83,2	84,0	79,5	74,5	74,0	77,3	75,8
Lithuania	78,0	81,2	75,4	81,4	75,6	80,5	81,9	82,4	82,3	77,4	79,1	80,2	80,3	80,4
Luxembourg	62,4	65,1	64,3	62,4	66,6	69,9	71,0	76,1	71,8	71,8	74,8	73,4	75,1	79,0
Malta	27,2	24,0	32,0	34,1	31,1	33,2	35,4	41,7	40,8	44,9	50,2	55,2	58,1	61,7
Netherlands	72,3	74,8	74,6	74,3	75,7	76,1	78,1	79,7	81,5	81,5	80,3	79,9	79,3	79,8
Poland	69,0	69,6	67,7	68,6	68,5	70,3	70,6	74,5	76,9	76,8	76,4	75,8	75,4	74,2
Portugal	79,8	78,1	75,9	78,3	78,8	76,4	80,4	79,4	80,9	79,2	78,9	78,3	76,0	76,3
Romania	76,2	75,9	73,5	73,2	75,5	72,6	73,2	72,8	71,7	71,6	72,0	71,1	71,6	71,3
Slovakia	72,5	76,9	75,2	75,8	72,5	72,8	72,9	75,7	76,9	74,3	72,6	70,8	71,3	70,7
Slovenia	89,1	88,6	89,9	89,5	87,5	87,9	89,3	88,7	88,6	88,2	87,4	86,2	85,8	84,2
Spain	52,5	55,0	56,1	58,5	61,1	63,6	66,6	67,7	68,2	66,7	65,6	66,7	65,8	64,7
Sweden	82,6	83,9	83,9	82,2	82,6	82,8	82,6	84,4	85,8	83,5	82,6	82,5	84,1	85,8
United Kingdom	72,5	73,5	73,4	74,0	73,0	73,2	72,4	73,0	73,1	73,2	72,1	72,3	73,3	74,4


Source : Eurostat LFS.

Annex Table 8: Employment rate of women 40-44 years old in European countries, 2000-2013

GEO/TIME	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Austria	74,5	75,7	78,4	80,2	80,0	79,3	80,7	81,8	82,7	83,6	83,7	83,8	83,3	83,7
Belgium	69,8	67,6	69,8	70,3	71,0	73,0	73,5	75,7	77,3	76,5	77,9	77,6	76,5	77,3
Bulgaria	74,9	72,0	72,1	73,6	76,5	76,8	78,3	83,0	83,5	81,2	78,5	77,7	77,8	77,3
Croatia	na	na	69,4	69,4	69,8	72,4	71,4	73,1	74,1	73,8	73,8	70,4	66,3	66,3
Cyprus	66,8	67,0	68,5	71,0	74,6	76,0	76,5	76,0	77,1	76,2	77,6	77,6	75,7	72,0
Czech Republic	83,0	85,2	85,4	81,9	84,1	83,6	85,1	85,7	87,3	86,6	84,2	84,8	85,1	84,4
Denmark	84,8	84,7	84,1	80,7	83,5	83,4	84,6	85,0	84,6	86,0	83,2	82,2	82,6	82,8
Estonia	79,7	85,2	79,2	79,1	85,2	83,1	85,6	84,7	87,2	80,4	78,6	80,5	85,0	83,9
European Union (28 countries)	na	na	70,9	71,2	71,9	72,4	73,5	74,5	75,0	74,7	74,3	74,3	74,1	73,8
Finland	81,7	82,5	83,3	84,2	82,6	82,0	84,1	85,0	84,3	84,6	83,9	84,6	85,0	83,0
France	72,5	73,8	75,1	76,7	76,5	76,1	77,3	79,1	79,5	79,3	78,7	79,4	79,4	78,9
Germany	74,5	75,1	75,1	74,8	74,1	75,2	76,6	77,5	78,1	78,6	79,7	80,8	81,1	81,2
Greece	56,3	55,6	56,6	59,4	61,3	62,0	64,6	65,1	66,6	66,0	65,4	62,9	57,9	55,3
Hungary	75,1	76,2	75,0	75,4	75,8	74,2	73,5	74,6	76,0	75,2	74,8	74,7	77,2	76,5
Ireland	59,3	62,6	64,4	64,1	64,4	64,6	64,1	65,0	64,7	63,6	60,9	60,0	61,9	62,9
Italy	54,3	57,2	57,0	57,0	60,7	61,0	61,8	61,5	62,2	61,3	61,8	61,7	61,8	60,5
Latvia	73,9	78,4	79,5	79,6	84,3	82,2	84,6	80,4	82,9	76,8	78,3	78,6	76,0	80,7
Lithuania	81,2	80,4	80,2	81,1	81,4	83,6	81,6	83,3	83,0	81,6	79,0	81,8	82,2	81,3
Luxembourg	63,1	64,2	64,3	65,7	65,4	67,7	71,5	70,4	68,4	71,3	72,4	73,9	76,6	75,8
Malta	29,8	26,1	28,8	31,0	29,8	31,4	29,8	33,4	41,3	41,9	43,2	48,7	52,5	54,8
Netherlands	71,6	74,0	75,7	74,2	74,6	75,7	77,3	78,9	80,9	81,6	79,8	78,5	78,4	78,8
Poland	70,4	70,1	69,3	69,2	70,7	70,3	71,8	75,4	77,8	78,1	77,5	77,5	76,9	76,6
Portugal	74,9	75,7	74,5	74,2	78,2	76,3	75,9	77,6	76,5	77,2	75,2	76,0	75,7	74,4
Romania	77,1	77,3	69,5	71,4	73,7	69,7	73,8	73,8	72,8	71,9	72,1	71,7	71,8	72,1
Slovakia	78,8	78,6	80,8	80,4	76,5	77,7	80,2	80,6	83,6	80,2	80,0	80,3	78,9	80,5
Slovenia	88,0	88,1	86,1	84,3	85,5	85,3	85,6	88,3	89,2	87,0	89,0	87,5	86,8	86,8
Spain	52,2	53,1	55,8	57,3	58,0	61,9	63,8	66,1	65,6	65,1	64,0	63,4	62,4	62,7
Sweden	83,9	86,4	85,9	85,1	84,0	84,1	83,5	85,1	85,7	85,4	84,2	85,7	86,3	86,4
United Kingdom	75,9	76,7	76,9	76,5	76,4	77,2	77,0	77,0	77,0	76,9	76,4	75,8	76,0	75,9


Source: Eurostat LFS.

Annex Figure 1: Temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees (%)




Source: Eurostat LFS

Annex Figure 2: Total Fertility rates in selected European countries 1950-2010.




Source: United Nations Population Statistics.

Annex Figure 3: Percentage of children under three cared by the formal arrangements by weekly time spent in care.




Source: Eurostat

Annex Figure 4: Percentage of children from 3 years of age to mandatory school age cared for by formal arrangements, by weekly time spent in care.



Source: Eurostat

Annex Figure 5: Reasons for difficulties concerning the usage of childcare (%)



Source: EC 2013

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